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From the Editors:
A recent report from the Consortium of Entrepreneurial Education (http://www.entre-ed.org/_entre/whitepaperfi-
nal.pdf) seems to have very well captured the spirit of entrepreneurship in the United States as well as the mission
of this Journal:
If you ask a group of business executives to describe the key to their company’s future success, you’ll get a pretty con-
sistent set of answers.While the terminology might differ, all of the answers call for a talented, competitive, skilled, cre-
ative,and entrepreneurial workforce.… What do they mean by talent? It’s not enough to simply be smart. Instead,we need
to nurture a new generation of innovators who have key skills in areas like science and engineering,but who are also able
to collaborate with others and to act in the face of new opportunities. In other words, we need innovators who combine
skill with an entrepreneurial mindset. . . .
The report goes on to belabor the fact that entrepreneurial education needs to be infused into our educational
system (and as early as grade school) as part of a lifelong learning process, which will create a nurturing environ-
ment for budding entrepreneurs.To that end, those of us who research, teach, and practice entrepreneurship must
embrace our responsibility to add to our body of knowledge about entrepreneurship, disseminate that knowledge,
and perfect our craft by enhancing our tools and skills sets.We hope that our own small efforts in the publication
of this Journal will add to the creation of that environment and stimulate others to continue this nation’s efforts to
remain competitive in an international marketplace where our biggest advantage would appear to be our creativity
and our passion.
This issue of the Journal deals with several critical issues of entrepreneurship including business succession, sim-
ilarities and differences between business and social entrepreneurs, Iranian entrepreneurs in the United States, fos-
tering entrepreneurship in Singapore, and the “entrepreneurial”director.The first article,“The Black Box: Unraveling
Family Business Succession” (Noel D. Campbell, University of Central Arkansas, Kirk H. Heriot, Columbus State
University, and Dianne H. B.Welsh, University of Tampa), adopts a resource-based view of the firm in order to exam-
ine cultural attributes of the family that lead to a competitive advantage and which are sustained over several gen-
erations.The authors develop a theoretical model and conclude that effective family culture is transferred to the fam-
ily firm, manifesting itself as “familiness” in those firms.This transference is predicted to increase the likelihood of
multigeneration family business succession and answers the call for better understanding of the concept of “famili-
ness.”
In the second article by Gina Vega, Salem State College and Roland E. Kidwell, University of Wyoming, we move
from examining succession planning to business start-ups in their article entitled “Toward a Typology of New
Venture Creators:Similarities and Contrasts Between Business and Social Entrepreneurs.”Using content analysis,Drs.
Vega and Kidwell develop their own model in which they differentiate entrepreneurs by their drive and motivation
(passion/ business; financial/social return) and therein develop a model that discerns four types of new venture cre-
ators.Further, they identify two methods of social entrepreneurship that demand more study: the Forward Approach
and the Backward Approach.The Forward Approach describes the actions of a person who has a passion for a mis-
sion and will do anything, including setting up a business, to support that mission.The Backward Approach describes
the actions of the serial entrepreneur who has the Midas touch for establishing businesses and who becomes
engaged in someone else’s vision.
Keramat Poorsoltan (Frostburg State University) introduces us to an interesting group of entrepreneurs here in
the United States, the Iranian business community. In his study entitled “The Tale of Iranian Entrepreneurs in the
United States,”Dr.Poorsoltan tested five determining factors for whether Iranian immigrants became entrepreneurs:
(1) difficulties they encounter in the broader labor market; (2) geographical concentration of the same ethnic group
and thus formation of ethnic enclaves; (3) low start-up costs and low economies of scale of many of enterprises they
establish; (4) ethnic social solidarity; and (5) possibility of tax avoidance in states with progressive tax codes. He dis-
proved all of his hypotheses and concluded that Iranian immigrants are not concentrated in a few geographical loca-
tions; do not demonstrate the same behavior that has been observed in other ethnic groups; do not prefer states
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 5
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with progressive tax codes; do not seek out self-employment because of language and racial barriers; and there was
no considerable ethnic social solidarity among the Iranian immigrant community.
We move from Iranian entrepreneurs in the United States to creating entrepreneurs in Singapore in Balbir B.
Bhasin’s (Sacred Heart University) article entitled “Fostering Entrepreneurship: Developing a Risk Taking Culture in
Singapore.”Bhasin notes in this study that Singapore,according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000,report-
ed very low entrepreneurial activity (approximately 1.75% of the total population versus the United States, nearly
10%, and Brazil, slightly more than 12%).This article describes in some detail the social and economic environment
in Singapore, which may have contributed to stunting entrepreneurial activity and outlines the efforts made by the
Singapore government to foster an entrepreneurial culture through a series of programs aimed at increasing the cit-
izens’ propensity and willingness to take risks.
In this issue’s Practitioner’s Corner in an article entitled “The Entrepreneurial Director” by Bruce C. Sherony,
Northern Michigan University, the reader is introduced to an innovative model for Boards of Directors that would
facilitate entrepreneurial behavior—specifically the entrepreneurial directorship should include the practice of char-
itableness,patience,humility, adhering to a set of values and contentedness in carrying out the board’s work routine.
By engaging in these behaviors, board members practice servant directorship.They provide personal involvement
in engaging in entrepreneurial projects as well as providing direction and guidance. If carried out properly, it will be
the entrepreneurial directors that will set a new standard for traditional boards to follow.
We then shift in the Practitioner’s Corner from Board of Directors to legal counsel (an interesting switch in these
days of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance) in an article by Stephen J. Schanz, North Carolina State University, entitled
“Entrepreneurial Selection and Use of Legal Counsel.” In this article, Dr. Schanz examines what a typical start-up
entrepreneur needs in terms of legal services and how legal counsel should be selected given the usual financial lim-
itations of most start-up firms.
As always, we are indebted to the authors, reviewers, and production staff who have worked ardently and ardu-
ously to make NEJE not only a reputable journal but a pleasure to be associated with. Please feel free to volunteer
your services as a reviewer,or submit an article,book review, letter to the editor,pedagogical piece,experiential exer-
cise, or case study for consideration for inclusion in future issues.We look forward to hearing from our readership
and appreciate your feedback on this issue as well as previously released issues.
Herbert Sherman
Editor
Long Island University
Brooklyn Campus
Joshua Shuart
Associate Editor and Web Master
Sacred Heart University
Lorry Weinstein
Editor Emeritus
Sacred Heart University
6
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 10 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol10/iss2/1
7et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Fall 2007
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2007
C A L L F O R P A P E R S
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND APPLIED MANAGEMENT
Management educators, trainers and practitioners are invited to contribute articles or cases for
possible publication in the Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management (ISSN 1930 0158),
a national refereed, online publication.
Manuscripts should be of interest to researchers, management instructors at the undergraduate
and graduate levels, and to practitioners.A more complete call including the submission 
procedure, review procedure, review information, and some suggested topics may be found at
http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/callforpapers.asp.
The Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management is listed with:
• ProQuest’s ABI/Inform;
• Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ—http://www.doaj.org/);
• dmoz Open Directory Project (http://dmoz.org/);
• Informatics J-Gate (http://www.j-gate.informindia.co.in/); and
• Cabell’s Directory of Publishing Opportunities (http://www.cabells.com/).
A style guide can be found at http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/styleguide.asp. Manuscripts
may not be previously published or be under consideration for publication by another journal.
Previous issues can be examined at http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/toc.asp.
Dr. David D. Van Fleet, Editor
Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management
ddvf@asu.edu
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U sing the family business succession, resource-based view of firms, familiness, and organiza-tional clan literatures, this article develops a
model based on the ability of the family business to use
familiness, a specific bundle of attributes deriving from a
family’s culture, as a competitive advantage for the family
firm. In particular, this resource-based framework of fami-
ly business shows how familiness can distinguish between
family firms that succeed beyond the second generation
and those that do not. Implications for future research are
discussed.
Recent research on family firms suggest that they outper-
form nonfamily firms (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb 2003;
Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005;Villalonga and Amit 2004).
Despite this, family business succession remains a black box
and among the most critical research questions facing fami-
ly business researchers.Despite a plethora of research in this
area, succession rates among family businesses remain low.
While the explanations for this have been widely debated
[see for example,Handler (1992) and Sonnenfeld (1988)],no
clear consensus has emerged. We propose an alternative
approach to the question of family business succession that
synthesizes the resource-based theory of the firm, family cul-
ture, and organizational clans.We attempt to answer the call
by Chrisman, Chua, and Steier (2005), in part, for research to
better understand the issues surrounding the concept of
familiness.
The definition of family business for the purposes of this
research is “a business governed and/or managed with the
intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held
by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same
family or a small number of families in a manner that is poten-
tially sustainable across generations of the family or families”
(Chua and Chrisman 1999, p. 28). They argue that a family
business is distinguished from others, not on the basis of the
components of family involvement,but by how these compo-
nents are used to pursue the family’s vision. Indeed, “the
vision provides the context, meaning, and reason for family
involvement just as a strategy provides the context for the
functional policy decisions of the firm” (Chua and Chrisman
1999, p. 31).
This study examines the differences between family-con-
trolled firms that fail or are sold in the second or later gener-
ations with persistently successful family-controlled firms.
What causes some family firms to remain healthy and with-
in the control of the founding family, while other family
firms cease to exist or pass out of the founding family’s con-
trol? We examine family-owned firms within the framework
of the resource-based theory of the firm, in which the
search for rare, valuable, imperfectly imitable, nonsubsti-
tutable resources has led researchers to consider a variety of
intangible resources (Barney 1991). We discuss family cul-
ture as an intangible resource that may be the key to family
business longevity. When family cultures are transferred
within family firms, the family culture may become a
resource that confers a competitive advantage.
Furthermore, family cultures will differ among families, and
not all family cultures will generate equal competitive
advantages.The article posits that these differences between
family cultures may explain why some family firms remain
successful and stay within the founding family. The article
also addresses the implications these factors may have on
succession.
Literature Review
Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
The resource-based view of the firm argues that firms differ
in their performance because of differences in their
resources that are valuable, unique, and cannot be imitated.
Such resources may be the basis for a sustainable competitive
advantage (Barney 1991).While resources can be either tan-
gible or intangible, intangible resources are more likely to
produce a competitive advantage because they are often rare
and socially complex, thereby making them difficult to imi-
tate (Barney 1991).
Organizational culture is more directly considered by Hall
(1992,1993).He argues that “intangible resources range from
the intellectual property rights of patents, trademarks, copy-
right and registered design; through contracts; trade secrets;
public knowledge such as scientific works; to the people
dependent; or subjective resources of know-how; organiza-
tional culture; and the reputation of product and company”
(Hall 1992, p. 135). Hall (1992) argues that culture applies to
the entire organization and includes habits, attitudes, beliefs,
and values that permeate the individuals and groups which
comprise the organization (Hall 1992).We agree with Zahra,
Hayton, and Salvato (2004) that the culture of a family busi-
ness is derived from the culture of the controlling family, and
may be the basis of a competitive advantage.
The Black Box: Unraveling Family Business Succession  
Noel D. Campbell
Kirk H. Heriot
Dianne H. B.Welsh
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Family Business Succession and Family
Culture
A summary of the literature on family business succession
suggests that our understanding of family business succes-
sion is somewhat limited to an understanding of some of the
behavioral and psychological factors involved. While much
of the succession research focuses on behavioral issues sur-
rounding the succession process, Dyer and Handler (1994)
recognize the need for more comprehensive models that
include how various dynamics of succession relate to one
another to form an understanding of the complexity and the
processes. Adapting from Hall (1992), we define family cul-
ture to be the habits, attitudes, beliefs, and values that per-
meate the individuals comprising the family. Family culture
provides a convenient referent to the resource-based theory
of the firm. Each family has its own unique family culture.
When this family culture manifests itself as an intangible
resource, it provides the basis for a competitive advantage.
We call this unique form of family culture, familiness.
Familiness is an imperfectly substitutable/imperfectly
exchangeable resource in the manner described by Barney
(1991). In some families, the family culture may be a
strength, but not necessarily a rare, imperfectly imitable,
nonsubstitutable resource (Barney 1991), while in other
families it will become a competitive advantage. As family
cultures differ from one another and from corporate culture,
so may the competitive advantage conferred by this
resource differ, thereby partially explaining why some fami-
ly firms remain viable and within family control while others
do not.
Family-controlled firms may possess advantages relative to
nonfamily-controlled and other family-controlled competi-
tors that are not directly related to family culture. However,
in this article,we focus on certain aspects of family culture as
a source of competitive advantage.A family’s culture may cre-
ate goal congruence among family members, and a shared
view of the world, the desired future,and a shared will for the
family to succeed—even at the expense of personal goals.
Families are also adept at identifying shirking and unsociable
behavior. The family will punish or correct the offender.
Should this tacit family culture be transferable to the family
firm, it may provide an imperfectly exchangeable resource
allowing for a persistent competitive. Furthermore, those
families most proficient with these skills—when those skills
are transferred within family businesses—will be the family
businesses most likely to succeed and remain under family
control. Not every family culture will be as effective at these
tasks, nor will family culture remain static through genera-
tions. As family cultures differ and evolve through genera-
tions, so may the competitive advantage conferred by family
culture differ, thus helping explain observed family business
succession patterns.
Familiness and Family Business Culture
Closely related to the concept of family business culture is
the term familiness. Familiness may be defined as interac-
tions between family members, the family unit itself, individ-
uals, and the business that lead to positive synergies; this cre-
ates competitive advantages for the firm (Habbershon,
Williams, and MacMillan 2003). Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma
(2005) took the definition one step further by suggesting
that families form firms to do just this—to institutionalize
their unique resources and capabilities for financial, and in
some cases, nonfinancial motives in a strategic management
theory framework. The social element of the family is of
major importance in understanding why family firms organ-
ize and persist over time, from one generation to the next.
Nordqvist (2005) looked at the behavioral effects of top man-
agement teams from a familiness perspective and cited this
as a unique advantage.The topic of familiness was important
enough for Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice to devote
an entire issue to the topic in May 2005. In the opening arti-
cle of the special issue,Chrisman,Chua,and Steier (2005) call
for more research to further define familiness by understand-
ing the conditions that lead to this phenomenon, the forma-
tion of family firms, and why they are successful.This article
is an attempt to answer this call, in part, to the black box
question of success and succession.
“Effective” Family Culture
Family culture in itself may be considered a competitive
advantage. Successful family firms—ones that remain com-
petitive and under family control—will share family cultures
that foster goal congruence among family members, and a
shared view of the world, the desired future,and a shared will
for the family to succeed—even at the expense of personal
goals.These successful family cultures will be adept at identi-
fying shirking and unsociable behavior.They will punish or
correct the offender. For brevity’s sake, we refer to such fam-
ily cultures as “effective.”
Families are likely to develop such effective cultural traits
because of their long, stable membership,potent antishirking
practices, and overlapping utility functions. A family mem-
ber’s well-being depends on the well-being of other family
members and the family firm as an entity. Conditions con-
ducive to development of effective cultures are frequently
present and passed on during socialization periods of fami-
lies.These would include a long history of intensive interac-
tion, stable membership, and an absence of perceived institu-
tional alternatives.This creates the ability in families to align
incentives and produce decisions in harmony with collective
interests, skills that some families will be able to transfer suc-
cessfully to a family-controlled business.
Some families display a remarkable ability to induce indi-
viduals to identify self-interest with collective interest. Family
10 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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businesses are often better able to align incentives than non-
family organizations. This is because of the fondness, affec-
tion, love, sense of duty, and willingness to sacrifice often
engendered by the family.Thus, family business members are
more likely to care about the family business’prosperity than
nonfamily business employees. Once again, this ability will
vary among families.The strength and effectiveness of these
family bonds may be modulated by external capital market
and/or social constraints facing the family. For example, con-
sider the traditionally underserved populations in the United
States.They include,but are not limited to, recent immigrants,
women, persecuted minorities, young people with good
ideas but no formal credit history. If no social and/or no cap-
ital market constraints existed, then the process of “red-lin-
ing” by banks would not exist and would not be illegal.
Also, when a family member deviates from the family cul-
ture, families have powerful abilities to detect and reduce
unsociability within the family. Family members know when
someone is shirking. Furthermore, families are able to apply
incredible leverage on the shirker to get him to amend his
behavior. Such abilities will be difficult to replicate in the
market because they are based on association and intense
THE BLACK BOX: UNRAVELING FAMILY BUSINESS SUCCESSION 11
No                                                                Yes
 or
Tangible Resources:
Location, distribution,
patents, etc.
Intangible Resources:
Including family culture
Barriers:
Time, nonfamily members, size,
market conditions, etc.
The firm does not remain under family
control The firm remains in family
control
Institutional
Environment:
Legal system,
assistance
programs
The firm fails or is
discontinued
Family Firm Continued Operations:
Does family possess “effective” culture?
Is this transferred as familiness to the firm?
Figure 1. Family Culture, Familiness, and Succession in the Family Business
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interpersonal interest. It also seems likely that families differ
in their ability to detect, admit, and limit shirking.This ability
is likely intensified by limited access to capital markets, lin-
guistic, or other cultural barriers. Therefore, those families
may more creatively monitor and limit shirking. Families that
control shirking will be more successful at transferring these
skills from the home to a family-controlled business. These
traits form an effective family culture.When family members
enter the family business, they have been presocialized at
home and are able to bring this shared culture into the busi-
ness. Our “effective family culture,” when transferred to the
family business, forms the basis of familiness in the family
firm.
However, these family cultural mechanisms are tacit.
They may not be transferable to outsiders, or persistent
through generations.Thus, family culture provides a founda-
tion for the family firm. If the family culture is an effective
culture, ceteris paribus, this family culture forms a lasting
competitive advantage. Moreover, families will differ in
these abilities, and the family culture itself will evolve over
time. That is, the value of a family culture will differ from
family to family and may not persist over time.Therefore,we
expect family firm survival rates and succession to differ
accordingly.
Thus families whose tacit family cultures demonstrate
greater degrees of intergenerational altruism and more effi-
cient unsociability-correcting practices should be more
effective. Families who transfer their tacit “effective family
culture” to the family business will exhibit more familiness
within the business. Businesses with more familiness will
have a competitive advantage, ceteris paribus. Therefore,
these families should be more likely to retain the family busi-
ness within the founding family.
Moreover, the value added from family culture should
vary both over time and from family to family, regardless of
whether the family and family firm under discussion is com-
posed of recent immigrants. Figure 1 illustrates the relation-
ship between family culture, familiness, and firm succession
in the family business. (Figure 1 is not a formal model but is
a schematic illustration.)
Discussion
The next step is to test the model, most likely through a sur-
vey method that would address several variables in the
model.The first variable will ensure that the firm is a “family
firm” as identified by Chua and Chrisman (1999), and further
defined in this article.
The second variable would be to gauge family interest in
continuing the business.
• To what extent does the current generation have an
interest in continuing the business as a family firm? 
• To what extent does the coming generation express an
interest in taking over the firm and maintaining it as a
family firm? 
The third variable would be to measure the effectiveness
of the family’s culture, both within and away from the busi-
ness.
• To what extent do family members share specific goals? 
• To what extent do those goals extend to the family firm? 
• To what extent are family members willing to identify
self-interest with the family’s well-being? 
• To what extent are individual family members willing to
place family goals ahead of personal goals? 
• To what extent does the family tolerate unsociable
behavior among family members? 
• How effectively does the family rein in unsociable
behaviors among family members? 
Information on the market conditions and the profitabili-
ty of the firm over time would also be collected. An empiri-
cal model relating the effective family culture/familiness busi-
ness culture to the intention of continuing the business as a
family business over time could then be formed with per-
formance factors considered. This variable must be able to
distinguish between family culture, in general, as merely a
strength, or even a weakness, of the family business, and as it
is manifested as familiness—the specific bundle of imperfect-
ly substitutable, nonmarketable characteristics that confer
competitive advantage.
Any empirical test of the concept of familiness must also
consider other potentially explanatory variables, such as tan-
gible resources and the institutional environment. Tangible
resources would be measured by asking about the degree of
value attributed to tangible variables such as location, distri-
bution channels, patents, etc., as discussed by Barney (1991).
Institutional environment would be measured by seeking
feedback from respondents on the availability of assistance
programs and legal assistance available to the family busi-
ness, the burden of taxes, regulation, corporate and govern-
ment corruption, and so forth. Continuing to evaluate the
model, we would also need to evaluate the presence of barri-
ers. Factors such as time, the mix of nonfamily members in
the firm, size of the firm, and market conditions would be
measured.For example, respondents would be asked the per-
centage of nonfamily members in the business.
As a means to illustrate the model,we consider immigrant
families. Immigrant families serve as a convenient referent to
this model because they face numerous obstacles in the
ordinary labor market. Self-employment is often a viable
route around those obstacles. Furthermore, immigrant fami-
ly members face fewer viable alternatives outside of the fam-
ily, and immigrant families may be better at identifying and
correcting unsociable behavior.These traits will be positive-
ly correlated with effective family culture, and a high degree
of familiness in the family businesses. However, as we have
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argued, these traits are not expected to remain stable across
generations.This is especially true for immigrant families as
they become assimilated into the general culture.Therefore,
we would expect higher initial formation rates and initial
succession rates of family businesses among immigrant fam-
ilies. However, we would also find support for our argument
if the succession rate of immigrant family businesses
declined over time, converging to the society mean as the
effectiveness of the family culture declines over time.
Importantly, researchers would need to consider that many
immigrant family firms are not intended to last beyond the
first generation. Immigrant families often choose self-
employment as their entry into a society, but want some-
thing different for their children.This suggests the applica-
tion of the Heckman model (Heckman 1976, 1979) of sam-
ple selection bias.
Summary
Dyer and Handler (1994) and Chrisman, Chua, and Steier
(2005) called for more comprehensive models of family busi-
ness succession to better understand the complexity and the
processes involved. Using the family business succession,
resource-based view of firms, familiness, and organizational
clan literatures, this article developed a model based on the
ability of the family business to use specific aspects of family
culture, familiness, as a competitive advantage for the family
firm. In particular, this resource-based framework of family
business shows the relationship between familiness, as a
competitive advantage that distinguishes between family
firms that succeed beyond the second generation and those
that do not.This article attempts to propose a more compre-
hensive model of family business succession by summarizing
the current literature on family business succession, family
culture, and the resource-based view of firms to form a
testable framework that identifies family culture as the core
strategic advantage of the family firm. Effective family culture
is transferred to the family firm, manifesting itself as famili-
ness in those firms.This transference is predicted to increase
the likelihood of multigeneration family business succession
and answers the call for better understanding of the concept
of familiness.While the article is limited to the introduction
of a new theoretical framework of the family business, it pro-
vides a first step at uncovering the black box of family busi-
ness succession issues.
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T his article advances a conceptual typology delin-eating the differences and similarities betweenbusiness- and social-sector new venture creators.
Our classification scheme differentiates business and
social entrepreneurs, considering characteristics of social
entrepreneurs in a larger entrepreneurial context.Within a
conceptual 2x2 typology based on two dimensions: drive
(passion vs. business) and desired return (financial ROI
vs. social ROI), we identify and classify 80 examples of
new venture creators into one of the quadrants of an
enterprise model of entrepreneurs. Preliminary results
reveal similarities between social and traditional entre-
preneurs and differentiate social entrepreneurs in terms of
traits, goals, tendencies, and motivational sources.
Traits, intentions, tendencies, and behaviors of entrepreneurs
have been a frequent topic of research in recent years with a
general focus on establishing typologies that examine similar-
ities and differences among individuals who start new ven-
tures (Baum and Locke 2004; McCarthy 2003; Miner 2000;
Woo, Cooper, and Dunkelberg 1991). Attempts to classify
entrepreneurs by these criteria have been useful in both
practical and academic approaches to the understanding of
new venture creation because they offer clues regarding the
potential for a successful new venture based on founder
characteristics. In addition, they provide frameworks in
which to study new business ventures and the people who
recognize opportunities, which in turn provide the rationale
for shifts of resources that result in the creative destruction
of existing enterprises (Schumpeter 1950) and long-term
economic growth.
Less attention has been devoted to the development of
typologies based on the characteristics, traits, intentions, and
goals of social entrepreneurs, a fast-growing group of global
innovators who create and sustain social value with new
enterprises or new approaches to address societal problems
(Dees, Emerson, and Economy 2001). Such a typology would
provide a means to evaluate new ventures in what has been
alternatively termed the independent sector (Cornuelle
1965), the citizen sector (Bornstein 2004) or the nongovern-
ment organizations (NGO) arena, and to help better under-
stand individuals who tackle challenges that appear beyond
the reach of both public (government) and for-profit inter-
ests.The lack of research contrasting characteristics of social
entrepreneurs vis-à-vis traditional entrepreneurs is unfortu-
nate in that social entrepreneurs have become increasingly
responsible for societal transformation, yet their role in such
change is poorly understood and underappreciated
(Bornstein 2004).
A growing research interest in social entrepreneurship
has resulted in several inquiries into who these people are
and what they do (e.g., Dees, Emerson, and Economy 2001;
Bornstein 2004; Linnanen 2002; Seelos and Mair 2005).This
article builds on that work and on previous research into
entrepreneurial typologies in the private sector to consider
characteristics of the social entrepreneur within a larger
entrepreneurial context systematically. We are careful to
clarify that social entrepreneurship and corporate social
responsibility, the expression of social concern by tradition-
al entrepreneurs through such tactics as economic/social
double-bottom line, are two different and distinct cate-
gories of research. The goal of our research is to identify
similarities between the social entrepreneur and the tradi-
tional entrepreneur as well as differentiate the social entre-
preneur in terms of traits, goals, tendencies, and sources of
motivation.
Social Entrepreneurship
DreamYard, an organization that brings arts education into
public school classrooms in New York City, started as a writ-
ing and theater workshop in the early 1990s. Founders Tim
Lord and Jason Duchin believe the key to DreamYard’s
growth during the last 11 years has been their ability to
establish relationships with school principals who have seen
the program work in other schools or have heard about it
through colleagues.A yearly arts festival at which school art-
work is displayed to the community has also helped build
DreamYard into an arts education program with a current
budget of $900,000 that includes 35 artists working with
8,500 students in 40 schools (Echoing Green 2005;
DreamYard, 2005).
John Sage, a former LSU football all-American and broker
at Merrill Lynch, began Bridges to Life in 1999.The organiza-
tion is a faith-based, religiously inspired, volunteer program
that seeks to “change the hearts” of convicted criminals who
are soon to be released.The goal is to persuade inmates not
to commit new crimes once they return to society by meet-
ing and talking with them. Sage was inspired to start the pro-
gram to deal with his own depression after his sister was
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murdered by a woman who was trying to steal her car
(Manhattan Institute 2004).
These two organizations, with their very different activi-
ties and goals, illustrate the concept of social entrepreneur-
ship in action. However, theory development for identifying
and classifying social entrepreneurs has been slow to appear.
“People understand this field by anecdote rather than theo-
ry,” says Bill Drayton, founder of Ashoka, an organization that
funds social enterprises all over the world.“A fellow we elect
becomes a walking anecdote of what we mean by a social
entrepreneur” (quoted in Bornstein 2004, p. 117).
Social entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurs have
been defined in many ways: construction, evaluation, and
pursuit of opportunities for social change (Roberts and
Woods 2005);change agents in the social sector who look for
new ways to serve clients and are willing to take risks to do
so (Dees, Emerson, and Economy 2001); good stewardship
practiced by people who try new things, serve people in
new ways, set up organizations that practice lifelong learn-
ing, and seek excellent performance (Brinckerhoff 2000);
transformative forces who use new ideas to address major
problems and relentlessly pursue their visions (Bornstein
2004); those who recognize when part of society is stuck and
provide new ways to get it unstuck by changing the system,
spreading the solution and persuading entire societies to
take new leaps (Ashoka 2005); and creators of  new models
“for the provision of products and services that cater direct-
ly to basic human needs that remain unsatisfied by current
economic or social institutions” (Seelos and Mair 2005, pp.
243–244).
Drawing on this literature, we define the social entrepre-
neur as an individual who addresses a serious societal prob-
lem with innovative ideas and approaches that have not been
tried successfully by private, public, or nonprofit sector enti-
ties. We differentiate social entrepreneurs from traditional
nonprofits, nongovernmental organizations, and philanthro-
pists (1) by the innovative means that social entrepreneurs
develop in solving problems and (2) by social entrepreneurs’
realization that, to varying degrees, they cannot accomplish
their goals without money; they are risk takers who balance
social activism with some degree of business savvy.
We also differentiate social entrepreneurs from private
sector entrepreneurs. Despite the fact that many social entre-
preneurs are interested in effectively managing their ven-
tures in a business-like manner, the biggest contrast between
social entrepreneurs and private sector entrepreneurs is the
nature of the immediate return each tends to seek. Private-
sector entrepreneurs are said to be market-driven whereas
social entrepreneurs are driven primarily by organizational
mission (Dees, Emerson, and Economy 2001).
Traditional entrepreneurs seek to capitalize on entrepre-
neurial opportunities, situations where “new goods, services,
raw materials, markets and organizing methods can be intro-
duced through the formation of new means, ends, or means-
ends relationships” (Eckhardt and Shane 2003, p. 336). In tak-
ing advantage of such opportunities, enterprising individuals
create value that spurs economic growth and provides a
sought-after return on investment (ROI) that has been made
in the new venture. ROI is generally expressed in financial
terms as a percentage return on the monetary investment in
a venture, but the return realized by the entrepreneur can be
intrinsic in the sense that a new venture provides continuous
renewal that leads to new entrepreneurial opportunities
(Timmons and Spinelli 2004) and benefits society over the
long term.
On the other hand, social entrepreneurs’ goals specifically
focus on improving society, and any profits generated by
their enterprises benefit disadvantaged people (Hibbert,
Hogg, and Quinn 2005). Achievement of their goals can be
measured by gauging the social return on investment (SROI),
which is calculated in monetary terms that express the value
of the enterprise to society. Dollars invested in social action
create economic and social returns over time in terms of
public cost savings that result from reduced use of govern-
ment benefits and services paid to target individuals as well
as new tax revenues generated by individuals working in the
social enterprise who would otherwise be unemployed or
underemployed (Vega 2002; REDF 2005).Types of gains such
as these are weighed against money spent on programs cre-
ated by social entrepreneurs and can be evaluated by SROI
metrics to quantify the value of the endeavor to societal wel-
fare.
Both the traditional and the social entrepreneur seek out-
comes that can be quantified and measured. ROI and SROI
contrast sharply with the metrics available to public sector
entrepreneurs: innovators and change agents who use the
power of elected or appointed office “to try to redirect local
politics and policies” (Schneider,Teske, and Mintrom 1995, p.
185). Examples of public entrepreneurs include city man-
agers who address difficult community problems, as well as
mayors who limit condo and commercial development with
antigrowth policies or, under different circumstances,
encourage balanced growth and moderate scale commercial
development. Public sector entrepreneurs generally realize
an opportunity that emerges due to community and voter
dissatisfaction with the status quo. The results achieved by
public entrepreneurs can be compared with those of social
entrepreneurs by measuring SROI in different categories.The
actions of public entrepreneurs might result in higher tax
revenues, fewer publicly supported community members,
lower crime rates, and higher education test scores, all of
which can be quantified in terms of dollars and are more
immediate, whereas social entrepreneurs would seek longer
lasting social change, such as developing jobs, providing job
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training and placement, improving living conditions, and sim-
ilar measures. The difference can be described as “giving a
man a fish” versus “teaching a man to fish.”
We next describe existing typologies and taxonomies of
entrepreneurs, the limited research into types of social entre-
preneurs, as well as goal-driven and motivation-driven typolo-
gies of entrepreneurs. This research is then employed to
develop and initially test a model that relates traditional
entrepreneurs to practitioners of social entrepreneurship.
The resulting typology is designed to shed new light on the
similarities and differences between different types of entre-
preneurs and to highlight the social entrepreneur phenome-
non, thus providing a framework for future research.Our the-
oretical focus here is on the entrepreneurial individual, rather
than delineating a more general model contrasting commer-
cial and social entrepreneurship (cf., Austin, Stevenson and
Wei-Skillern 2006).
General Entrepreneurial Typologies
Following the philosophy of Miner (2000), we treat typolo-
gies as theoretical constructs to be tested initially through
qualitative analysis of existing passive data. In this section,we
describe general, broad-based entrepreneurial typologies
grounded in the personality traits and characteristics of tradi-
tional entrepreneurs.This overview will lead to consideration
of the limited typologies applicable to nontraditional (i.e.,
social) entrepreneurs, and to contextual typologies, focused
on goals and motivations as observed in the activities of tra-
ditional entrepreneurs.
Less than 30 years ago, there were “no theories in the
entrepreneurship field. . . . Lastly, there have been no signifi-
cant models in entrepreneurship upon which to base a theo-
ry of entrepreneurship” (Wortman 1987, p 264). Wortman
(1987) called for more research using the outcome measure
of venture growth, and cessation of studies of entrepreneur-
ial characteristics until more sophisticated research designs
and adequate theoretical frameworks were developed. This
call,among others (Ireland and Van Auken 1987;Woo,Cooper,
and Dunkelberg 1991), resulted in a long series of studies on
firm development, treating the entrepreneur as superfluous
to the firm itself (Sarasvathy 2004).This is not surprising, if
studies are grounded in economics rather than in psycholo-
gy or management, but theories of the firm overlook the
prime force, the essence of the creator of the firm.This prime
mover always has a story to tell, a story based on motivation,
individuality, opportunity, and passion.
Examination of entrepreneurial characteristics, popular in
the early years of entrepreneurship research (1960–1990),
fell into disfavor when only minimal correlations of personal-
ity with entrepreneurial success were found (Aldrich and
Wiedenmeyer 1993). However, despite these early weak
results, the appeal of research into entrepreneurial traits as
potential predictors of success returned after the develop-
ment of an analytical model using multiple interactions of
several variables (Baum and Locke 2004), which resolved the
tendency of older models to provide typologies that were
neither replicable in studying disparate groups, nor attributa-
ble to diverse entrepreneurial populations (Woo,Cooper, and
Dunkelberg 1991).
According to Woo and her colleagues, the classification of
entrepreneurs into two gross categories—craftsmen and
opportunists—was engaging because it suggested a com-
plete set of characteristics rather than one unique trait to
identify and predict behavior. These two gross categories,
although supported overall by later research, have not sup-
planted the idiosyncratic approaches or categories of individ-
ual studies because “none of the studies on entrepreneurial
typologies has employed the same set of criteria” (Woo,
Cooper, and Dunkelberg 1991, pp. 97–98).Woo and her col-
leagues used a set of three variables—goals, background, and
managerial style—in their research, which did “not cluster as
tightly or as consistently” (p. 107) as they had expected.As a
result, they recommended that future research offer a strong
theoretical framework for the selection (and omission) of
specific characteristics and particular consideration of earli-
er typologies to determine if they could be reused with a dif-
ferent population. In addition, they recommended that
researchers provide explanations for those entrepreneurs
who do not fit into whatever typology is being built.
Bearing these cautions in mind, we considered Baum and
Locke’s new model, which used individual variables to
describe unique interactions and relationships between per-
sonality traits, and included a new variable called “new
resource skill” (“the ability to acquire and systematize the
operating resources needed to start and grow an organiza-
tion” [Baum and Locke 2004, p. 587]). This variable is very
helpful when looking at the success of social entrepreneurs,
specifically because venture growth is the outcome measure
of Baum and Locke’s study,and,along with SROI, is one of the
few concrete success outcomes of social ventures available.
The other two variables considered by Baum and Locke
were “passion” and “tenacity,” both of which seem intuitively
supported in the entrepreneurship literature (Baum and
Locke 2004).Passion is defined as a genuine love of the work,
and tenacity as perseverance in the face of obstacles.These
three variables were mediated by a fourth subvariable, the
ability to communicate a vision.This skill was shown to be
directly related to venture growth:“. . . communicated vision
was shown to be independently and quantitatively related to
performance in a field setting over a multi-year period”
(Baum and Locke 2004, p. 595).
Passion, tenacity, communicated vision, and new resource
skill are traits that appear frequently in the literature (Kets de
Vries 1996; Liang and Dunn 2004), but have not played a sig-
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nificant role in previous outcome analysis.These four charac-
teristics and their interrelationships signal a significant
change in the way we perceive the entrepreneurial phenom-
enon. Instead of looking for the high risk, innovation focused,
overly controlling individual, we are looking at people who,
“by conveying a sense of purpose, they convince others that
they are where the action is.Whatever it is—seductiveness,
gamesmanship, or charisma—entrepreneurs somehow know
how to lead an organization and give it momentum”(Kets de
Vries 1996, p. 25).
This ability to convince others is easily tracked ethno-
graphically, through stories, myths, cases, and textual analysis
(McCarthy 2003; O’Connor 2002). According to O’Connor,
entrepreneurs can be categorized in a typology consisting of
Personal Stories (Founding Stories and Vision Stories),
Generic Stories (Marketing Stories and Strategy Stories), and
Situational Stories (Historical Stories and Conventional
Stories).These stories map well on the four entrepreneurial
characteristics mentioned above, as follows: Autobiographi-
cal Stories and Vision Stories describe “passion”; Marketing
Stories describe “communicated vision”; Strategy Stories
describe “new resource skills”; and Historical Stories and
Conventional Stories describe “tenacity.” These stories are
embedded in a larger story that forms the context of the busi-
ness/new venture development. The larger story can be
termed the “business environment,”and will lead to a descrip-
tion of the firm development or outcome analysis.
Moving from a narrative description of entrepreneurial
behavior to a more traditional, psychological typology of
business founders, we can refer to Miner’s (2000) clinical
work, which led to a theoretical framework describing four
different types of business founders: the Personal Achiever,
the Real Manager, the Expert Idea Generator, and the
Empathetic Supersalesperson. Each of these types reflects
varying levels of a specific subset of characteristics, not all of
which must be present to identify a founder within a catego-
ry. This psychological typology incorporates elements from
earlier trait studies with the more global typology later pro-
posed by Baum and Locke.
The Personal Achiever, characterized by motivation for
self-achievement, type A personality, desire for feedback on
achievements, desire to plan and set goals for future achieve-
ments, strong personal commitment to their ventures, desire
to obtain information and learn,and internal locus of control,
exhibits all four of Baum and Locke’s traits (passion, tenacity,
communicated vision, and new resource skill). The Real
Manager exhibits positive attitudes toward authority, desire
to compete with others, desire to assert oneself, desire to
exercise power, directive cognitive style, desire to stand out
from the crowd, and desire to perform managerial tasks,
which describes tenacity and new resource skill.The Expert
Idea Generator demonstrates desire to personally innovate,
conceptual cognitive style, high intelligence, and desire to
avoid taking risks, which comports with passion and tenaci-
ty.The Empathic Expert displays understanding in cognitive
style and shows a desire to help people, reflecting passion
and communicated vision.
Miner’s work indicates a weak association of characteris-
tics with entrepreneurial propensity in the two categories of
Expert Idea Generator and Empathic Expert, leading us to
consider the effects that may be occurring but not reflected
in these two categories. In fact, these are the categories
where we would place social entrepreneurs who,we hypoth-
esize, have quite different characteristic behavior from the
traditional entrepreneurs who are the subjects of the preced-
ing studies.
Typologies of Social Entrepreneurs
Social entrepreneurs are sometimes described as “green” or
environmental entrepreneurs (Linnanen 2002) who focus on
“sustainable business strategies and organizations” (Seelos
and Mair 2005, p. 241). The movement to sustainability
appears on a grand scale in the efforts of the United Nations
and the World Commission on Environment and
Development to focus the corporate world on the plight of
the less fortunate and to link quantifiable business goals with
social goals of human rights, health, education, and protec-
tion of the environment (United Nations 2005).The eradica-
tion of poverty by 2015 is the overarching mission. But social
entrepreneurship validates the “think global act local”philos-
ophy, as most social ventures remain small and local (Seelos
and Mair 2005).The mission may be large, but the implemen-
tation is manageable.
On a less global scale, social entrepreneurship has been
defined in terms of “corporations that provide resources and
guidance to [these sorts of] organizations as Timberland and
Compaq do with City Year and as UPS does with Second
Harvest” (Margolis 2001). These entrepreneurs, focused on
the social side of business,concentrate on funding the efforts
of other organizations to address critical social problems as
ancillary to the “real”goals of their business,which is to make
profit, whereas other organizations are developed purely for
the purpose of raising funds to support or endow groups that
provide direct service to populations in need. In this way,phi-
lanthropists (as distinct from social entrepreneurs them-
selves) use their business skills for mission-driven ends
(Bornstein 2004).
Who undertakes missions such as these? Apparently, quite
a lot of people do. The use of nonprofit companies as
“enabling structures for social value creation . . . can access
capital that business entrepreneurs usually cannot” (Seelos
and Mair 2005, p. 242).Whether focused on the direct serv-
ice side of social problems or more so on the funding side of
them,social entrepreneurs “reflect a determination to change
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the whole of society” (Seelos and Mair 2005, p. 244). Although
very little empirical data is available, and we have been able
to locate only one established typology of social entrepre-
neurs, some specific traits and characteristics have been
ascribed to them. Seelos and Mair (2005) suggest that social
entrepreneurs are “social heroes with entrepreneurial talent”
(p. 244) and “very good at starting new initiatives, but not
necessarily at managing organizations or projects” (p. 245).
Linnanen (2002, p. 77) echoes these statements, claiming
about ecopreneurs:“Their reason for running an enterprise is
not solely to make money but involves also a willingness to
make the world a better place in which to live.This personal
commitment also increases their marketing credibility and
trustworthiness as business partners.”Linnanen speaks about
their high ethical profile, their drive, and their insistence on
concern for the environment.
His typology is based on two considerations: the desire to
change the world and the desire to make money and grow.
The resulting matrix shows four ecopreneurial types: the
Successful Idealist (high in desire to make money and high in
desire to change the world); the Opportunist (high in desire
to make money and low in desire to change the world); the
Self-Employer (low in desire to change the world and low in
desire to make money); and the Non-Profit Business (low in
desire to make money and high in desire to change the
world). These four types can be matched to the previously
described traditional entrepreneurial types, as well as to the
typology that we propose, particularly after considering the
goals and motivations of various entrepreneurial types.
Contextual Typologies
It makes sense to begin consideration of entrepreneurial
motivations and goals with the seminal concepts introduced
by the grandfather of entrepreneurial study, Joseph
Schumpeter. Bearing in mind that Schumpeter’s theories
were grounded in economic theory, his analysis of the entre-
preneurial personality nonetheless rings true, especially in
the three typologies identified in The Theory of Economic
Development, 1934 (Goss 2005). The first two typologies
clearly define the traditional entrepreneur, whose behavior
includes “introducing a new good; introducing a new method
of production; opening a new market; conquering a new
source of raw materials; and reorganizing an industry in a
new way . . .” and whose motivation includes “the desire to
found a private kingdom or dynasty; the will to win, to fight,
and to conquer; and the joy and satisfaction that comes from
creating and problem solving” (Goss 2005, p. 206).
These behaviors and motivations do not resonate as much
for the social entrepreneur, however.The social entrepreneur
fits more comfortably within the third typology offered by
Schumpeter, the one that inhibits rather than supports entre-
preneurial action: that is, the desire to avoid innovation
because of the difficulties inherent in planning it, the desire
to avoid change and deviation, and “the fear of social sanc-
tioning: the condemnation and disapproval that is heaped
upon iconoclasts and deviants” (Goss 2005, p. 206). They
might be called “reluctant” entrepreneurs, members of a
deviant subgroup. Social entrepreneurs seem, in fact, to
thrive on the very deviance they exhibit by their creative,
often socially difficult paths of behavior.This is confirmed by
theorists in sociology, who claim that “belonging” or group
membership provides an important key to “emotional ener-
gy,” that feeling of strength, commitment, and social inclusion
that allows people to persevere through difficult conditions
and in challenging environments (R. Collins in Goss 2005).
We have seen evidence of this tendency among our social
entrepreneurs, who tend to band together for mutual sup-
port in organizations, associations, and online listservs. Social
entrepreneurs take great pride in their activities, especially
when they can point to being the first, the only, the biggest,
the smallest, etc. in their chosen area (see examples below).
The idea of “belonging” or of “community” appears in dis-
cussions of entrepreneurship in fields other than business
and sociology. In particular, deLeon (1996), writing in the
area of political policy analysis, presents a typology of public
entrepreneurs that corresponds well to other existing typolo-
gies, and also focuses on the nature of entrepreneurial moti-
vation in the public sphere. The four varieties of entrepre-
neurs in the deLeon model include: Hierarchy, Competitive
Pluralism, Community, and Anarchy. These four fit comfort-
ably within the quadrants identified in the models discussed
above.
DeLeon suggests, like Drucker (1985), that entrepreneur-
ship requires innovation. She refers to public entrepreneurs
as “Robin Hoods of the bureaucracy”(p. 497), clearly outcasts
and single-minded iconoclasts. She claims that the character-
istics of egotism, selfishness, waywardness, domination, and
opportunism are functional prerequisites for the entrepre-
neurial role.This is likely true for the social entrepreneur as
well as the public entrepreneur, particularly in terms of way-
wardness, domination, and opportunism. These motivations
suggest a confident rejection of societal norms and are a driv-
ing force behind social entrepreneurs since “an individual
who decides to become an entrepreneur is in a sense, going
against the norms of society” (Teal and Carroll 1999, p. 229).
This entrepreneurial tendency to violate societal norms is
one with which the social entrepreneurs, who are motivated
by social concerns that have been created by the actions of
the society in which they live, are very comfortable. In effect,
they are seeking to combat the externalities of traditional
entrepreneurial activities, which may include “financial loss,
unemployment, loss of income security, the breaking up of
existing organizations, and environmental degradation”
(Hannafey 2003, p. 102).Their motivations seem to replicate
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those of the “imitating entrepreneur”rather than those of the
“initiating entrepreneur” (Baumol 1986 in Hannafey 2003, p.
101). The initiating entrepreneur introduces new products,
methods, or procedures; the imitating entrepreneur uses
such innovations to improve economic life.
In another typology reflected in Hannafey’s work (2003),
Collins and Moore (1970, in Hannafey 2003) proposed that
entrepreneurs maintain their relationships in transactional
mode; that is, relationships are limited to utilitarian purposes
and last only as long as they can be useful. We suggest that
many social entrepreneurs maintain their relationships in
transformational mode; that is, they are enduring, growth-
oriented, and other-directed.This approach was also taken, in
a modified format, by McCarthy (2003) in a study of Irish
entrepreneurs. She determined there were two types of
entrepreneurs: the charismatic and the pragmatic.The charis-
matic entrepreneur is characterized by the “stereotypical
view of entrepreneurs . . . visionaries, risk-takers, highly per-
suasive, passionate, with ambitious and idealistic goals. The
pragmatists did not fit the stereotypical mold and were more
cautious, more rational and seemed to adopt a more calculat-
ing and instrumental approach to the business” (p. 158).The
charismatic entrepreneur seems to comport with the
Incubating Entrepreneur (see below), while the pragmatic
entrepreneur corresponds to the Enterprising Entrepreneur.
Shook, Priem, and McGee (2003) present an inclusive
review of entrepreneurs and their methods of venture cre-
ation.They conclude that entrepreneurs’“causal beliefs [are]
key to furthering our understanding of venture creation”
(p. 395), based on their research findings that indicate the
paucity of empirical data that connect the individual’s char-
acteristics with the acquisition of resources. In the next sec-
tion we address major issues regarding that connection.
An Enterprise Typology of Entrepreneurs
As our goal is to relate characteristics of traditional entrepre-
neurs to social entrepreneurs within an enterprise model of
entrepreneurs,we consider several common threads that run
through the literature on entrepreneurship, individual as well
as social. Descriptions of charismatic, craftsman, initiating,
and transformational entrepreneurs are consistent with the
word “Passion” as an effective means to describe entrepre-
neurs who have these types of characteristics. Pragmatic,
opportunist, imitating, and transactional reflect the term
“Business” as a means to reflect the characteristics of this
type of entrepreneur. Applying these thoughts to an earlier
typology of social entrepreneurs (Linnanen 2002), Passion
tends to suggest the entrepreneur who predominantly wants
to change the world whereas Business indicates the entrepre-
neur who focuses on making money and growing the enter-
prise. Many proponents of social as well as traditional entre-
preneurship might argue that to achieve the first goal suc-
cessfully one must pursue the second with vigor.
Based on the preceding literature review, we advance a
model of entrepreneurship that combines private sector,
profit-seeking entrepreneurs and social sector,cause-fulfilling
entrepreneurs. Our literature review indicates that private
and social sector entrepreneurs are driven predominantly
either by passion for a cause (or product or service) or by
desire to establish and grow a viable sustainable business (or
social enterprise). On a second dimension, the difference
between private and social sector entrepreneurs is in the
returns that are sought.As noted earlier, private sector entre-
preneurs pursue return on investment (ROI) and social sec-
tor entrepreneurs seek a social return on investment (SROI).
The social enterprise typology we now discuss is illustrated
in Table 1.
ROI with Passion: The Incubating
Entrepreneur
In 1984, Roxanne Quimby was supporting her two children
by selling clothing and crafts at local flea markets near her
Maine home when she met a beekeeper named Burt Shavitz.
Their romance led to the start of a business, which first
involved Quimby’s investigating new product uses for Burt’s
discarded beeswax.Her efforts eventually evolved into a hive
of environmentally friendly personal care products. Roxanne
and Burt started with $400 of savings and produced their
wares in an abandoned one-room schoolhouse. By 1993,
Burt’s Bees, Inc. was pulling in more than $3 million, but the
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two founders continued to live modestly in rural Maine
(Linden 1993).
Through the 1990s, the business thrived as its products
were place in boutiques, major department stores, and
national catalogs. Burt’s Bees relocated to North Carolina to
meet production and distribution demands, and the business
grew to a $50 million a year concern. In 2003, Quimby sold a
controlling stake in Burt’s Bees to a buyout investor group,
and focused her financial gains on spearheading develop-
ment of a national park in Maine as she considered a poten-
tial career in politics (Adamson 2003).
Roxanne Quimby illustrates the Incubating
Entrepreneur.This individual displays high levels of passion
for a particular idea or product.The entrepreneur displays a
strong interest in obtaining not only a return on the invest-
ment in terms of financial capital but in the entrepreneur’s
psychic investment in the new venture as well.This entre-
preneurial type is similar to the Expert Idea Generator
(Miner 2000) in that the person is a highly intelligent inno-
vator.The Incubating Entrepreneur is unlikely to start with
a business plan and may view the new venture as lifestyle
motivated or cause related rather than as a high-growth
opportunity. Of course, such a focus does not preclude
strong financial success.
Other examples of the Incubating Entrepreneur include
Tom and Kate Chappell,Tom’s of Maine founders, who stress
ethical as well as profitable business leadership; Anita
Roddick who dedicated her Body Shop to the pursuit of
social and environmental change; and Don Burr, founder of
the 1980s’ discount airline People Express, and cofounder of
new venture Pogo, potentially the world’s first air taxi serv-
ice.At the failed People Express, Burr stressed practices that
at the time were unusual in the industry: universal employee
stock ownership, employee training across disciplines, and
employee input (Martin 2005).
ROI with Business: The Enterprising
Entrepreneur 
The story of Ray Kroc and the McDonald brothers is well
known. By the mid-1950s at age 52, Kroc, a long-time paper
cup salesman, had moved on to selling the Multimixer, a six-
spindled milk shake machine. He heard stories about a ham-
burger restaurant in San Bernardino, California, that had
bought eight of the machines and decided to investigate.
Kroc found a potential gold mine operated by the McDonald
brothers, and quickly made a deal with them to start
McDonald’s restaurant franchises across the country. His first
thought was that more such restaurants would sell more milk
shake machines, but as he developed the opportunity he saw
that fundamental attention to details, quality standards, low
cost and rapid growth of locations would lead to a much
greater success (Kroc and Anderson 1977).
Ray Kroc was strongly focused on business aspects of the
McDonald’s venture, balancing the achievement of starting
something new with a strong interest in seeing that the ven-
ture was run properly and that it grew and made money.
Kroc exemplifies the Enterprising Entrepreneur. The
Enterprising Entrepreneur has less concern and preoccupa-
tion with the invention or the application that formed the
need for a new venture and more with the aspect of starting
a business and the value that it will create for the entrepre-
neur, investors and for society. Coupled with establishing the
business is a strong desire for financial return on investment,
both for the entrepreneur and potential investors. Perhaps
more prone to take calculated risks than incubating entrepre-
neurs such as the McDonald brothers, the Enterprising
Entrepreneur is likely to either start with a business plan or
see the need to establish one soon after the venture is off the
ground.
The Enterprising Entrepreneur is similar to the classic cre-
ator of new ventures (i.e., Miner’s Personal Achiever). Other
examples of Enterprising Entrepreneurs include Fred Smith
who took his college term paper idea and turned it into
Federal Express and Herb Kelleher who fought regulatory
and political barriers to establish Southwest Airlines.
SROI with Passion: The Deeds Social
Entrepreneur 
John Dixon observed a serious problem in his inner-city
Buffalo, New York, neighborhood: many fatherless children
hanging out on the streets, kids who lacked discipline or the
means to develop any. Too often, such situations led
teenagers to crime or other types of destructive behavior.
Dixon, a former U.S.Army sergeant, put together a structured
mentoring program designed to help the kids develop
healthy, productive habits, through participation in military
drills,help with homework by retired and suburban teachers,
and classes on sexual abstinence and anger management. He
anticipated a few people in the neighborhood would be
interested in his Junior Uniformed Mentoring Program
(JUMP), but within months hundreds of people were attend-
ing. John and his wife, Catherine, charged small fees to those
who joined the program but did not always collect them.The
program was honored in 2001 by the Manhattan Institute as
a social entrepreneurship award winner,but John Dixon died
not long after, and JUMP suspended its operations
(Manhattan Institute 2004).
The Deeds Social Entrepreneur, like John Dixon, is highly
passionate about a cause and for that cause to succeed it
must provide a greater good for society, becoming a source
of social return on investment. The Deeds Entrepreneur is
concerned with service, less so with personal profit, and is
something of a maverick. The Deeds Entrepreneur is related
to Miner’s Empathic Extrovert.This person chose social caus-
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es because of a strong desire to help others because in part
he or she can feel their pain and would like to improve soci-
ety. In addition, the Deeds Entrepreneur exhibits a healthy
helping of the “Cockeyed Optimist Quotient”—a sense of
trust and an upbeat, the glass is half-full, we-can-do-it-if-we-all-
pull-together, boot-strap philosophy that often creates such a
strong belief in the potential for success that the participants
are able to make that potential a reality.Other elements of the
typical Deeds Entrepreneur include a willingness to self-cor-
rect, to share credit, to break free of established structures, to
cross disciplinary boundaries and to work quietly in an ethi-
cal manner (Bornstein 2004).
Prominent Deeds Entrepreneurs may be more difficult to
identify, in part because their passion for what they are doing
may lead them to stay small and isolated in a particular area
(e.g., the downtown storefront, or innercity neighborhood),
and avoid the limelight even when they need to raise money
or awareness for the cause. Yet, a number of Deeds
Entrepreneurs have risen to prominence, including Joan
Ganz Cooney (originator of Sesame Street), James Grant
(head of UNICEF from 1980–1995), St. Francis of Assisi
(founder of the Franciscan order), and Mother Teresa.
SROI with Business: The Dollars Social
Entrepreneur
A prime example of a social entrepreneur who combines
social return with business acumen is Bill Drayton, founder of
Ashoka: Innovators for the Public. Ashoka operates in 46
countries and has assisted 1,400 social entrepreneurs, sup-
porting them with professional advice, analysis, and $40 mil-
lion in funding (Bornstein 2004).When he started the organ-
ization in the early 1980s, Drayton likened its approach to a
venture capital firm.Although this characterization might not
have impressed those with leftist ideologies, his business
model—to promote innovators in social change—struck a
chord with potential supporters who had business experi-
ence (Bornstein 2004, pp. 64–65).
Like Drayton, the Dollars Social Entrepreneur is a strong
manager, as opposed to the typical social entrepreneur, so
there is robust institutional feeling and the capability of
working within organizations and with other organizations.
The Dollars Social Entrepreneur seeks first to take a business
approach to achieve social outcomes  (an SROI focus) and in
the process recognizes the need for gathering money to do
good works, and attempts to run the social enterprise as a
business.The Dollars Social Entrepreneur is perhaps less pre-
occupied with passion for an idea and more so on the most
effective way to get it done. Miner’s “Real Manager” takes
form as a Dollars Social Entrepreneur. This entrepreneur
seeks to be assertive, to exercise power, to stand out from the
crowd, and to compete with others. The Dollars Social
Entrepreneur may be at the center of a network to raise
money for social enterprise organizations or may be an indi-
vidual who takes a strong business focus to develop and
build his or her own social-sector organization.
Some well-known Dollars Social Entrepreneurs include
Pierre Omidyar, in his role as funder of an innovative program
to provide start-up loans to aspiring entrepreneurs in devel-
oping economies; Mohammed Yunus, whose Grameen Bank
spearheaded the idea of micro, collateral-free credit in third-
world villages; and Millard Fuller, who went from being a mil-
lionaire in business at age 29 to become a recommitted
Christian who sold his possessions, founded Habitat for
Humanity and employed responsible business practices as an
important element in his efforts to build a worldwide hous-
ing ministry.
Identification of Cases and Qualitative
Classification 
Based on the conceptual arguments advanced in this article,
we used a qualitative classification strategy involving the
identification of cases (Bailey 1994, pp. 6–9) in an effort to
appropriately place entrepreneurs into quadrants of the
typology advanced in this article. The authors enlisted the
assistance of two graduate students at different institutions to
gather cases involving entrepreneurs in both the business
and the nonprofit sectors. The research assistants were not
provided information about the typology nor informed of the
research focus as they selected cases for further examination.
A convenience sample of 80 cases was selected from arti-
cles that appeared in sources including Forbes magazine, the
Manhattan Institute, Fast Company magazine, Social
Enterprise Alliance, Social Enterprise Source Book,
LexisNexis newspaper articles, and Echoing Green, a self-
described angel investor in the social sector.After the cases
were compiled, they were provided to the two authors who
then reviewed them independently and classified them into
one of the four quadrants of the typology.
As the authors reviewed the 80 cases, the following com-
binations of key words, phrases, or descriptions of the entre-
preneur or venture were sought from the cases to classify the
entrepreneurs into one of the four quadrants:
• Incubating (passion, product, ideas, psychic investment,
innovation, lifestyle or cause-related motivation)
• Enterprising (market-focus, business aspects, creation of
financial value, evidence of business plan)
• Deeds (passion for a cause,greater good for society, little
interest in personal financial reward,service orientation,
maverick behavior in the aid of others, personal involve-
ment, tendency to stay small, e.g., think globally, act
locally)
• Dollars (social return,business acumen, large-scale ideas,
generation of money to implement but not provide
hands-on service, assertiveness, power, competition) 
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Table 2 shows the 80 cases with the names of the select-
ed entrepreneurs, how they were classified by the authors,
and the venture or activity presented in the cases. The
authors independently agreed on the classifications of 72 of
the 80 cases, an agreement rate of 90 percent. Of the 80
cases, 16 were classified as Incubating Entrepreneurs, 24 as
Enterprising Entrepreneurs, 25 as Deeds Social
Entrepreneurs and 7 as Dollars Social Entrepreneurs. The
other 8 cases did not result in agreement as to an appropri-
ate classification.
Discussion
These data are preliminary and need to be substantiated with
a larger sample and the use of quantitative techniques such
as cluster analysis. Even with an interrater reliability of 90
percent, several areas of dispute exist. These focus on cate-
gories that sit side-by-side, emphasizing the problem of cate-
gorizing activities from passive sources.
In these disputed cases, the two raters read the same infor-
mation but inferred differing meanings from the reports,
most particularly in the area of Incubating Entrepreneurs and
Enterprising Entrepreneurs. It appears difficult to identify the
level of business acumen that an entrepreneur has at the
beginning of his or her enterprise. Frequently, the organiza-
tional myth develops in such a way that the entrepreneur is
portrayed in press releases or corporate materials as an inno-
vator of a new product who is disingenuous but aggressive
and eager to enter a particular market.This description cross-
es the boundaries between Incubating Entrepreneurs (who
focus on innovation and product and have few business orga-
nizational skills) and Enterprising Entrepreneurs (who focus
on markets and have more sophisticated business skills).
The same phenomenon occurs between Deeds and Dollars
social entrepreneurs. Inasmuch as social entrepreneurs tend
to define themselves through extremes (biggest, smallest, old-
est, newest, etc.) and who we defined based (in part) on size,
a social entrepreneur like Don Shalvey who developed Aspire
Charter Schools can be considered a Deeds Social
Entrepreneur because of his direct involvement with educa-
tion and his focus on social justice. He can just as easily be
considered a Dollars Social Entrepreneur because his mission
is “punctuated by successful, highly entrepreneurial initia-
tives,”which indicate a powerful business orientation,and the
large amount of money he has raised in the nonprofit sector.
All the entrepreneurs in this preliminary study were U.S.
based. We recognize that entrepreneurship has developed
differently in different countries, notably in the United
Kingdom, where the social entrepreneurship movement is
far more established.An in-depth discussion of international
social entrepreneurship is beyond the scope and goals of the
current research, but would provide an interesting topic for
further inquiry.
It is within this context of interpretation that the limita-
tions in the qualitative analytical method we used appear.
There is no way to corroborate the content analysis of sec-
ondary source data, allowing for fuzzy interpretation and cat-
egorization. In addition, the significant issue of entrepreneur-
ial progression or life cycle appears. If we consider one of our
more well-known social entrepreneurs, Pierre Omidyar,
founder of E-Bay, this issue becomes clear.We are considering
Omidyar in the Dollars Social Entrepreneur phase of his
career as he presents funding for an innovative approach to
microfinance: very small business loans to entrepreneurs in
the developing world. Had we done our research at an earli-
er time, as he founded eBay, we might have seen Omidyar as
an Incubating Entrepreneur—a man with a terrific idea who
was trying to level the playing field while making some
money himself.Alternatively, as the company grew, Omidyar
might be seen as an Enterprising Entrepreneur, a man with
the golden touch of making a business work in a new mar-
ket. At some other point, he might be considered a Deeds
Social Entrepreneur, working hands-on with local individuals
in his own community. Because we focused on archival, pas-
sive case studies that appeared within a specific time frame
and examined the actions and outcomes of individual entre-
preneurs rather than motivations and activities over time—a
snapshot rather than a movie—our findings show limited
generalizability.
Further, we identified two methods of social entrepre-
neurship that demand more study: the Forward Approach
and the Backward Approach. The Forward Approach
describes the actions of a person who has a passion for a
mission and will do anything, including setting up a busi-
ness, to support that mission.This individual is “driven.” This
seems to describe the Deeds Social Entrepreneur and, if we
equate “mission” with “product,” it also fits the Incubating
Entrepreneur.
The Backward Approach describes the actions of the seri-
al entrepreneur who has the Midas touch for establishing
businesses and who becomes engaged in someone else’s
vision. This could describe the Dollars Social Entrepreneur
who raises funds for innovative projects but has little interest
in providing direct service. This is the way many micro-
financing organizations get their start and also the way some
large corporations might fulfill their social responsibility
goals.These two approaches need to be investigated in terms
of the ways in which they interact with the progression of
entrepreneurs through the four identified categories.
We hypothesize that entrepreneurs move from quadrant
to quadrant, in some developmental mode, not yet identified.
It is this process of progression that lends particular impact
to the understanding of new venture creation in the arena of
social entrepreneurship. Further, we propose that the vari-
ables of  “new resource skill” and the “ability to communicate
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Classification New Venture Creator Venture or Activity in Case
Incubating E Caterina Fake Flickr photo classification
Incubating E Ellen Sabin The Giving Book
Incubating E Eric Anderson Space Adventures
Incubating E Eric Teller BodyMedia medical monitoring
Incubating E J. Stuart Cumming Eyeonics lens implants
Incubating E Jane Leu Upwardly Global immigrant service
Incubating E Jeffrey Jonas Systems Research & Development
Incubating E Jennifer Brill Silverton Mountain ski area
Incubating E John Mackey Whole Foods Market
Incubating E Jordan Kassalow Scojo Vision reading glasses
Incubating E Michael Collins Big Idea Group
Incubating E Mike & Brian McMenamin McMenamin’s pub chain
Incubating E Peter van Stolk Jones Soda
Incubating E Rhonda L.Anderson Creative Memories scrapbooking
Incubating E R.Fernandopulle/ P. Kothari Renaissance Health care
Incubating E Steve Shannon Akimbo box,TV-Internet connection
Enterprising E Bob R. Simpson XTO Energy
Enterprising E Christopher Godsall Triton (underwater) Logging
Enterprising E David Kaval /Amit Patel Golden Baseball League
Enterprising E Dawna Stone Her Sports magazine
Enterprising E Debra Feldman Job Whiz career counseling
Enterprising E Derek Sulger SmartPay bill paying in China
Enterprising E Douglas Levin Black Duck software programs 
Enterprising E James N. Baker Telabria wireless network
Enterprising E James Kowalick Kowalick Inc.,Taguchi Method
Enterprising E Jitendra Saxena Netezza computer company
Enterprising E John Paul Magill Achilles Group personnel consulting
Enterprising E Joseph Cohen Polsteins online store
Enterprising E Lawrence Kasanoff Blackbelt TV channel
Enterprising E Mark F. Brown Mohegan Indian gambling
Enterprising E Mejrema Alimanovic Food shops in Bosnia
Enterprising E Michael Workman Pillar Data Systems
Enterprising E Patrick Grady Talaris corporate spending software
Enterprising E Robert McGrath Private Retreats/Distinctive Retreats
Enterprising E Ross Mandell Sky Capital Holdings
Enterprising E Scott Milener Browster internet company
Enterprising E Shane Yeend Imagination Entertainment
Enterprising E Stephen Wynne DeLorean Motor Company
Table 2 continued next page
Table 2. Classification of the Cases
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Enterprising E Steven Shore/Barry Prevor Steve & Barry’s Univ. Sportsware
Enterprising E Vern Raburn Eclipse Aviation 
Deeds SE Amy Lemley First Place Fund, foster children 
Deeds SE Chad Pregracke Living Lands and Waters
Deeds SE Eric Adler/ Rajiv Vinnakota SEED Charter School
Deeds SE Gerald Chertavian Year Up minority job training
Deeds SE Gillian Caldwell WITNESS human rights defenders
Deeds SE Ian Marvy/Michael Hurvitz Added Value markets 
Deeds SE Jack Whittaker Donated millions to new church bldg.
Deeds SE James G. Hunter New Jersey Orators
Deeds SE John Dixon JUMP youth training, Buffalo NY
Deeds SE John Sage Bridges to Life 
Deeds SE John Wood Room to Read
Deeds SE Jonathan Schurr New Leaders for New Schools
Deeds SE Kerry O'Brien D.C. Employment Justice Center
Deeds SE Luke O'Neill Shackleton School
Deeds SE Mark Levine Credit Where Credit is Due
Deeds SE Martin Fisher SuperMoneyMaker irrigation pump
Deeds SE Melanie Carr A Fighting Chance, New Orleans 
Deeds SE Michael Danziger Steppingstone tutoring program
Deeds SE Redonna Rodgers Center for Teaching Entrepreneurship
Deeds SE Richard Oulahan Esperanza Unita, Milwaukee
Deeds SE Rosalie McGuire Rotary Club fundraiser, Batavia, NY
Deeds SE Tom Vacca Wayside Soup Kitchen, Maine
Deeds SE Vic Lewis/Tino Milner Community faith-based activities
Deeds SE Whitney Smith Girls for a Change
Deeds SE William S. Barnes Volunteer program for uninsured
Dollars SE Al Sikes READ Tutoring Program
Dollars SE Alex Counts Grameen Foundation, microfinance
Dollars SE Jacob Schramm College Summit, college prep.
Dollars SE Kyle Zimmer First Book, distributors of free books
Dollars SE Linda Rottenberg Endeavor, entrepreneurship support
Dollars SE Paul Brainerd New environmental foundation funds
Dollars SE Pierre Omidyar Microfinance contributions
Deeds/Dollars Don Shalvey Aspire Charter Schools
Deeds/Dollars M.Tenbusch/D.Varner Think Detroit youth sports program
Incubating/Dollars Rick Aubry Rubicon Program, bakery, landscape
Incubating/Dollars Sara Horowitz Working Today, benefits program
Enter. E /Incub. E Andrew Buchholtz G2 Tactics, license plate scanner
Enter. E /Incub. E Dave Pearce/D. Hollars Miasolé, solar programs
Deeds SE/Incub. E George Oldenburg Acadiana Zoo
Enter. E /Incub. E Noel Lee Monster Cable Products
1. Eight cases in dispute between the authors are shown in italics.
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a vision” provide the business foundation for most social
entrepreneurship ventures, as many Deeds Social
Entrepreneurs either bootstrap their organizations or, by
their enthusiasm, “sell” their ideas to a serial Enterprising
Entrepreneur for assistance and funding.These propositions
provide fertile ground for future research into the similarities
and differences between business and social entrepreneurs.
On the other hand, we do not consider pure philanthropists
to be part of the Dollars Social Entrepreneur model unless
methods used or services provided indicate innovative (i.e.,
entrepreneurial) approaches.
The impact of social entrepreneurs on societal transforma-
tion promises to increase due to the elimination of many
social programs previously funded by the federal govern-
ment and as the resulting emphasis on volunteerism grows.
The private sector is assuming more public responsibility
and utilizing entrepreneurial tactics to do so in a cost-effec-
tive way; an examination of these activities and the people
who perform them can lead to our further understanding
and appreciation of their contributions as well as provide the
support necessary to enhance their efforts.
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I n practice and in theory, as the findings of thisresearch reveal, the Iranian business community is anew and different, nonconforming immigrant group
in the United States. This study explores certain aspects of
the Iranian business community in light of a survey done
by the author. The article compares and contrasts findings
of the survey with those of existing literature that has been
written about the business communities of various ethnic
groups.The results of this study disagree with the literature
in most areas. One difference is that the Iranian business
community in the United States does not fit into the gener-
al understanding that ethnic groups have economic
enclaves and niches. They are dispersed in all 48 contigu-
ous states, and their businesses cover practically any possi-
ble line of entrepreneurial activity.These entrepreneurs are
highly educated, and 76 percent of them are between 30
and 50 years old.Among them, 84 percent are male, a typ-
ical American profile.
Why Do Immigrants Turn to Self-employ-
ment in the United States?
Different researchers have expressed a variety of reasons for
self-employment by immigrants in this country. Light and
Sanchez (1987) describe difficulties—including exploita-
tion—immigrants encounter in the broader labor market
that leads them to seek self-employment. Portes and Bach
(Immigrant Entrepreneurs 1997) coined a new term:“ethnic
enclave.” Their model, which is based on research about
Cuban immigrants in Miami, specifies several attributes of
the “enclaves,” including geographical concentration, inter-
dependent networks of social and business relationships,
and a relatively sophisticated division of labor. These
enclaves function as a substitute environment for the immi-
grant, softening the incorporation into the host country by
providing employment and community. Waldinger and his
collaborators (1990) proposed dropping the term “enclave.”
They suggested entrepreneurial appeal is determined in
part by prevailing market conditions and the availability of
those businesses to immigrant ownership.“Some opportuni-
ties are ready-at-hand, such as supplying co-ethnics with
foodstuffs, newspapers, clothes, and cultural specific goods
from their country of origin . . . however, in order to grow
beyond this circumscribed . . . market, immigrant businesses
must expand, and they generally do so along predictable
tracks” (Waldinger et al. 1990). The model proposed by
Waldinger and his associates is typified by four distinct
elements:
1. Immigrant businesses often expand into underserved
markets.
2.They seek out enterprises with low start-up costs.
3.They seek out enterprises with low economies of scale
4.They provide goods when demand is unstable or uncer-
tain.
All these elements were present in the case of Korean
entrepreneurs in Chicago.
In pursuing self-employment, immigrants normally rely on
their ethnic group for support and sustenance and this may
create a feeling of solidarity. Pessar (1995) conducted field-
work among Hispanic immigrants in Washington, D.C., and
found that ethnic solidarity is neither pervasive nor even nec-
essarily desired by immigrants. Research by Yuengert (1995)
proposed that states with progressive tax codes are more
desirable by the self-employed because tax avoidance oppor-
tunities are abundant. The same research suggested that
immigrants from countries with high self-employment rates
have higher than average self-employment rates in the United
State.This is partially because they have more experience in
business operations. Yuengert’s research concluded that
these two factors account for 62 percent of immigrant self-
employment.
Several disadvantages of immigrant entrepreneurship
exist. The ethnic solidarity, hypothesized by some
researchers, can be exclusionary and clannish.The informal
business transactions in immigrant communities can some-
times be distinctly illegal.To some of the relatives involved,
the family ties that keep a corner store open 24 hours a day,
may seem exploitative and unfair. Immigrant self-employ-
ment can be seen more as a lifeboat than a ladder; that is, it is
more a survival strategy than an indication of socioeconom-
ic success (Immigrant Entrepreneurs 1997).
Objectives of the Study
Immigrants resort to self-employment in the United States
because of (1) difficulties (such as language or racial barriers)
they encounter in the broader labor market; (2) geographical
concentration of the same ethnic group, and thus formation
of ethnic enclaves; (3) low start-up costs and low economies
of scale of many of the enterprises they establish; (4) ethnic
social solidarity (whereby members of the same ethnic group
are employed and or transactions are done within the same
The Tale of Iranian Entrepreneurs in the United States
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ethnic group); and (5) the possibility of tax avoidance in
states with progressive tax codes (and therefore concentra-
tion in those states).
After reviewing the literature I became interested in learn-
ing how these factors may be related to Iranian entrepre-
neurs in the United States. Consequently, I built my research
around the five reasons described above and developed the
following hypotheses:
H1.The Iranian business community is primarily engaged
in low start-up businesses.
H2. Iranian immigrants are concentrated in a few geo-
graphical locations.
H3.The Iranian business community prefers states with
progressive tax codes.
H4. Iranian immigrants seek self-employment because of
language and racial barriers.
H5.The Iranian immigrant community demonstrates con-
siderable ethnic social solidarity.
Definition
The term entrepreneur as defined by Longenecker, Moore,
and Petty (2000) is used in this study.They define entrepre-
neur as active owner-managers, and include in their defini-
tion second-generation members of family-owned firms and
owner-managers who buy out the founders of existing firms.
By adopting this definition, one may include an enterprise
that consists of one person—a type of business that any aspi-
rant individual may decide to start—or a firm that employs
100 people.What makes these firms drastically different from
the much larger firms is their structure and operation.
Methodology
The most difficult part of the study was compiling a list of
enterprises, their owners, and addresses. No single database
contained the necessary information. I developed a list by
looking through many regional and local business directo-
ries, telephone books, and newspaper and magazine adver-
tisements. I even used business cards attached to communi-
ty bulletin boards and flyers. Eventually, I assembled a list of
about 12,000 businesses. From this list, approximately
10,000 names and addresses belonging to professions that I
was not looking for were set aside. Among them were physi-
cians, dentists, pharmacists, lawyers, media, and charity
organizations. In sum, 2,060 business addresses remained.
The businesses were scattered in 48 lower states. I could not
detect any Iranian-owned business in the states of Alaska and
Hawaii.
Based on a comprehensive study of the literature on immi-
grants and immigrant entrepreneurs, I developed a detailed
questionnaire in the Persian language. I pretested the ques-
tionnaire among Persian-speaking associates, and some busi-
nessowners in the Rockville, Maryland, area.
For the new Iranian year (in 1998) I sent a cover letter
attached to a listing of 40 principle questions to the owners
of the 2,060 firms. A self-addressed, stamped envelope was
included with the questionnaire.The major reason for prepar-
ing the questionnaire in Persian was to delete names of any
non-Iranian firms in the database. My assumption was that a
non-Iranian will not be able to read the questionnaire, and
thus she or he will not distort the survey. In addition, I
believed the use of the mother tongue would be an extra
incentive for a person to participate in the survey.
Some businesses returned the survey with an explanation
that we are not Iranian or an Iranian did not own the busi-
ness. Interestingly, some of these individuals had selected
Persian names for their establishments. It is possible that
some firms wanted to avoid the survey and their explanation
was just a polite excuse. One restaurant owner returned the
blank questionnaire along with some small amount of salt
and pepper in the envelope and had wished me a healthy,
delicious meal! The unanswered responses represented a
mere 25 instances. No packages were returned because of
incorrect addresses as I had checked the information many
times for their accuracy. In one remarkable instance, an
Iranian who was unable to read Persian,but was proficient in
speaking the language, called to say that a friend would read
the questions to him and enter his responses in appropriate
sections of the questionnaire.
After two months I sent a reminder to those who did not
respond to the initial mailing. Overall, after deleting wrong,
incomplete, and ineligible questions, I had access to 414 use-
able questionnaires for use in this analysis. A 20 percent
response rate is a reasonable and satisfactory rate in this type
of survey. Although I had informed the respondents that they
would stay anonymous,about 45 percent demonstrated inter-
est in being identified by sending their business cards, flyers,
and even photos and promotional items along with their
responses. Many of these entrepreneurs requested a copy of
the final research.
The majority of the items in the questionnaire were meas-
ured on a 3-point scale.The possible responses were 3 = very
important, 2 = important, 1 = not important. Some questions
had yes/no answers,while others were descriptive questions.
Results and Analysis
Composition of Employment
Enterprises in the study fall into the category of small size.
Table 1 indicates that on average, 6.5 persons work for these
firms. If we generalize the above findings to the 414 respon-
dents, we may conclude that these Iranian entrepreneurs
have created 2,691 jobs in the United States.This is in the line
of all other small businesses that have come to be recognized
as the engine of job creation in the United States.The Small
Business Advocate (2007) quotes the U.S. Bureau of Labor
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Statistics findings that small businesses generated 65 percent
of the net employment growth between September 1992
and March 2005,confirming similar data from the U.S.Census
Bureau. Bhidé (2000, p. 338) believes that “. . . the tens of mil-
lions of new jobs created in the United States in the past two
decades, in the face of shrinking of the workforces of Fortune
500 companies, clearly point to an increasing proportion of
employment in the ‘entrepreneurial sector.’”
Type of Business Activities
Table 2 offers a panoramic view of business variety of the
firms in the research. The types of businesses selected by
Iranian entrepreneurs cover a wide spectrum. They are not
restricted, as Waldinger et al. (1990) reports, to the low-cost
startups (retailing grocery, repair, nursery) as some of these
businesses (manufacturing, financial, and construction) fall
into high-cost start-ups.
The Center for Immigrant Studies, funded by the conserva-
tive Federation for Immigration Reform, disagrees with the
importance of immigrant entrepreneurs and maintains that
immigrants are not as entrepreneurial as the U.S.-born citi-
zens, and they are engaged in low startup businesses.
According to their study, in 1997, only 11.3 percent of immi-
grants were entrepreneurs, compared with 11.8 percent of
native-born Americans (Thomas 2003).The Census Bureau fig-
ure, at least partially, disagrees. It reports that 22 percent of
Iranians own their businesses. A website suggests that the
Iranian community in the United State has founded 280 major
national firms, and has 400 of its people in the highest posi-
tions in national companies.The same website claims that the
total contribution of the Iranian community to the United
States economy is estimated at more than $400 billion.
Kotkin’s report (1999) invalidates the negative views sur-
rounding the immigrant entrepreneurs. He states:
The rates of entrepreneurship were even more pro-
nounced in five-county greater Los Angeles. Analysis by
California State Northridge demographers James P. Allen
and Eugene Turner found the highest rates of entrepreneur-
ship among people of Israeli, Iranian, Lebanese and
Armenian heritage. Although estimates of the number of
Middle Easterners in Los Angeles range up to 300,000 to
400,000, their influence is felt powerfully across a series of
industries: garment, jewelry, textile, manufacturing, real
estate, retail and distribution.The Middle Eastern immigrant
story in Los Angeles has taken a different turn. Although
they own barely 7% of the companies and constitute a neg-
ligible part of the workforce in the city’s clothing factories,
Middle Eastern immigrants control the higher-end stars of
the regional industry, including Guess,Bisou-Bisou,Jonathan
Martin,Tag Rag and BCBG.They are, if anything, more dom-
inant in the textile industry; more than 120 Iranian compa-
nies,owned by Jewish,Muslim and Christian entrepreneurs,
have helped drive sales of L.A.’s textile industry from $300
million in 1982 to an estimated $20 billion today.
In terms of percentage, these entrepreneurs may not be
large, but collectively they are a significant economic power.
Among ethnic groups, some have become predominant in
certain economic niches. In explaining why this is the case,
Cao (2000) says this prevalence might be due to the ethnic
group’s history (such as Jews in the garment industry), factors
found in the host country (involvement of Koreans with liquor
and wig stores in the United States), or their traditional posi-
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Table 2. Types of Business Activity
Type of Activity Percent
Retailing 31
Construction:Various phases (drawing, design-
ing, building) 16
Repair: Electrical, electronic, appliances 11
Artistic: Photography, painting, fashion designs 10
Financial: Insurance, mortgage, stockbrokers 9
Wholesales: Parts, food 9
Manufacturing 3
Transportation: Charter, car rental, towing 1
Research and invention: Computer 1
Misc.:Translation, nursery, unspecified 9
Total 100
Table 1. Composition of Employees in
Various Establishments
Employment Information
Total: 414
Firms
Percentage of male workers in the popula-
tion
67
Number of the people employed by the
smallest establishment 
1
Number of the people employed by the
largest establishment 
40
Average number of employment by all firms
in the study
6.5
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tions in the occupational hierarchies of their homeland before
migration. The Iranian entrepreneurial community in the
United States does not fall into any of these patterns. In
response to the survey question “Is this your first business
experience?”60 percent of the participants said yes.Moreover,
Iran is not a hierarchical society, and has no occupational hier-
archy, a practice long forbidden after the arrival of Islam.
With the above discussion, as far as this survey could
accomplish, H1 (The Iranian business community is primari-
ly engaged in low startup businesses) is not a valid statement.
Dates When Businesses Were Founded
The United States has always been a destination for Iranian
immigrants. In the past, however, when leaving the home-
land, most travelers felt that their trip to America would be a
temporary one. The majority of the trips were education
related as most Iranians were coming either as students or as
visiting faculty. That changed after the 1979 revolution and
travels became long-term stays. The year before the revolu-
tion marked the beginning of an extraordinary increase in
the number of immigrants.
The embryo of the Iranian community was conceived in
1970s and many of the actual geographical, social, and demo-
graphic aspects took shape during the same decade. An
increase in total number of Iranian immigrants was followed
by a parallel increase in the business activities of this commu-
nity (Table 3).
Founders of the Firms
Participants were asked about the firm’s founder. A large
majority (86%) responded that they are the original founders.
The remaining 14 percent indicated that they purchased
their enterprises from other entrepreneurs. Similarly, they
were asked if the year of foundation had any relationship
with being the original founder. Table 4 illustrates this con-
nection.
I attribute this large increase in self-starting businesses to
a drastically grown population base after the 1979 Iranian
Revolution.This base allowed and encouraged those individ-
uals who had any doubt about starting a business of their
own to overcome their reservations.
Geographic Concentration of the Iranian
Business Community
It is well known that in the United States, California is the
home away from home for Iranians. Heavy concentration of
Iranians in a few population centers—including Los Angeles,
San Diego,and San Francisco—is quite visible even for a new-
comer. Westwood Street in Los Angeles is home to many
Iranian-owned business firms. Among them, one may find
numerous bookstores, restaurants, and supermarkets.
Nonetheless, as shown in Table 5, California was not always
the favorite destination for Iranians. In the 1970s California
gained status as a leader in attracting Iranians and has
retained this position ever since. However, as Iranians dis-
perse throughout the United States, strong contenders such
as Texas, New York/New Jersey, Maryland/Washington,
D.C./Northern Virginia, and Georgia (specifically Atlanta)
have gradually emerge. Southern states are experiencing a
boom in ethnic businesses. Badie (1999) describes the situa-
tion in Atlanta:
Drop off a load of dirty clothes at practically any local
dry cleaners and the business owner is likely to be Asian—
Korean, actually.And if you want to have your nails dressed
up, the manicurists and the owner probably will be Asian
too, but Vietnamese.These are obvious examples of a phe-
nomenon firmly rooted in cities like Los Angeles and New
York but beginning to take seed in suburban Gwinnett
County.
In 1980, the Census Bureau reported 121,505 Iranians in
the United States, concentrated first in California (35%) then
in New York (8%), followed by Texas (6%).The Census Bureau
identified 210,941 Iranians in the United States in 1990, and
approximately 283,226 foreign-born Iranians in the United
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Table 4. Correlation between Year and
Type of Foundation
Year of Foundation % Self-founded % Purchased
1940–1960 50 50
1970–1979 70 30
1980–1984 92 8
1985–1989 92 8
1990–1998 92 8
Table 3. Year Firms Were Founded
Year of Foundation Percent
1940–1960 3.5
1970–1979 6.0
1980–1984 25
1985–1989 33
1990–1994 29
1995–1998 1
No response 2.5
Total 100
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States in 2000 (Gibson and Jung 2006). However, the Iranian-
American community claims the number is much larger than
the Census Bureau figure suggests. Of the afore-mentioned
283,226 Iranians, according to the 2000 Census, 158,613
(55.9%) lived in California. Other states with large concentra-
tions of Iranian immigrant populations were New York with
17,323 (6.1%);Texas, 15,581 (5.5%); Virginia, 10,889 (3.8%);
and Maryland, 9,733 (3.4%) (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006).
I conclude that H2 (Iranian immigrants are concentrated
in a few geographical locations) does not hold true, and once
again, this ethnic group does not demonstrate the same
behavior that has been observed in other ethnic groups.
The Attractiveness of Progressive 
State Tax Codes 
A study by the Tax Foundation (Dubay and Atkins 2006), a
think-tank based in Washington, D.C., proposes a state tax
business climate index to measure tax friendliness of various
states. I compared the index with findings by Yuengert
(1995) that suggest progressive tax codes are more desirable
by the self-employed to see if Iranians operated businesses in
tax-friendly states. According to the index, the top 10 states
with the best state business tax climate are Alaska, Colorado,
Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. On the other hand, the
worst state tax codes are found in Arkansas, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. As we can clearly
observe, selection of the business location by Iranian entre-
preneurs has not been influenced by the progressive tax
codes,and a glance at Table 5 invalidates H3 (Iranian business
community prefers states with progressive tax codes).
Lifeboat or Ladder
Two metaphors—a lifeboat and a ladder—can be applied in
testing H4 (Iranian immigrants seek self-employment
because of language and racial barriers).A lifeboat keeps an
overboard passenger from drowning and allows the person
to survive—for a short while—at sea. On the other hand, a
ladder gives altitude, and raises the position of its user. Most
Iranians have not taken initiative just to survive (H4). This
group is distinctively different from other immigrants, thanks
partially to the revolution that allowed a mass departure of
resources from Iran.These resources were both financial and
mental. While will examine the mental resources, entrepre-
neurs participating in the study were not asked to divulge
any financial information.
Education Level of Iranian Business
Community
The U.S. 1990 Census indicated that a significant percentage
of Iranian immigrants (77%) have university-level education.
Before the 1979 revolution (Report by Iran Interest Section
2000), Iran had the largest number of university students
abroad than any other country in the world. By 1977, the
number of students studying abroad was 227,497. By 1979,
51,310 Iranian students were in the United States, ranking
first among foreign nationalities.Thousands of students were
enrolled in Iranian universities and colleges.The shock of the
revolution drove these educated individuals out of Iran and
beyond the reach of the revolutionary elements. Many of
these educated students chose to relocate to the United
States, thus explaining the large number of educated Iranians
(Table 6).
The 1990 Census figure (77%) for university-level educa-
tion of the Iranian immigrant community is in agreement
with the findings of this study (79%).This result concurs with
Bhide’s (2000) finding that 81 percent of the incorporated
company founders he interviewed had college degrees.
In comparison, according to the U.S. Census Bureau
(March 1999), only 25.2 percent of the total U.S. population
had a university-level education.The high education level of
this ethnic community is in sharp contrast to what Borjas
(1996) presents. According to Borjas, by 1990 the most
recently arrived immigrants had 1.3 fewer years of schooling
and earned 32 percent less than natives.
This high academic achievement has undoubtedly con-
tributed to the high occupational and accomplishment of
this community as well. According to the 1990 Census, 43
percent of Iranians were in professional and managerial posi-
tions;35 percent, in technical and administrative activities;10
percent, in various services; and the balance were spread
over farming, craft, and other miscellaneous jobs.
In addition, the 2000 Census reports that the median fam-
ily income for the Iranian community was $52,333.That was
substantially above the national average of $36,422
(Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006).
Reasons for Starting the Business
As shown in Table 7, Iranian entrepreneurs have a multitude
of reasons for starting their businesses.
USA Today (1991) published the result of a survey and
declared independence as an important factor for self-
employment. Of those who had left corporate jobs, 38 per-
cent said their main reason for leaving was their desire to be
their own boss. In this research, independence was declared
a far important rationale for starting one’s own business.
More specific responses indicated the following reasons:
Continuing the family tradition, limited choice of other jobs,
desire to be in touch with other Iranians, love of own area of
expertise, never being able to work for anybody else, using
unexploited time of family and self. Conditioned to hard
work was another reason for starting a business, reinforcing
Freud’s observation that one of the great pursuits of human
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experience is work. Ivan Light, among others, argued, “The
more hardships and frustrations immigrants experienced in
the mainstream economy, the more likely they were to seek
alternative opportunities through self-employment”
(Immigrant Entrepreneurs 1997, p. 4)
Respondents emphasized the importance of a larger pop-
ulation as their base of operation, and deemphasized the sig-
nificance of their unemployment. In fact, 59 percent of the
respondents disparaged unemployment and believed it was
not a very important reason for starting a business. It is an
interesting statement in view of findings by Bhidé (2000). He
mentions that people with secure, well-paying jobs are less
likely to start their own business because of the high oppor-
tunity cost for them. Nevertheless, that majority (59%) who
disagreed with the notion of unemployment as a very impor-
tant reason for starting business had a good education.They
could not have stayed unemployed. Opportunity cost for this
group must have been high. It appears that overqualification
for the entrepreneurs who participated in this survey lacked
a meaningful influence.
Ethnic Social Solidarity
I found no evidence to support H5 (there is some consider-
able ethnic social solidarity among the Iranian immigrant
community). Pessar (1995) also refutes the assumption of
ethnic solidarity.Table 8 provides clear proof of absence of
such solidarity, at least among the Iranian ethnic community.
Actually, one Persian-language publication in Maryland
(Tehran Post) regularly blames Iranians for not demonstrat-
ing such solidarity.The presumed solidarity, I assume, comes
from giving priority of employment to one’s ethnic group,
competing within a closed circle, and limited chain of suppli-
ers. In the enterprises I observed, I found no such exclusion-
ary behavior. For example, architects seek clients from any
available source; grocers attract customers from all ethnic
groups; and service-related business request work from non-
Iranians as well as Iranians.
The Ethnic/Racial Composition of Employees
Overall, 32 percent of participates indicated that all of their
employees are Iranian.The rest belonged to other ethnic and
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Table 5. Important Centers of Business Activities for Iranian Entrepreneurs
Year of Foundation Important Centers of Activity Types of Activity
1940–1960 Varies 38% artistic 
12% financial 
12% construction 
12% retail 
1970–1979 77% California 
33% elsewhere
31% retail 
15% construction 
15% financial 
15% artistic
1980–1984 58% California 
13% New York/New Jersey 
13% Washington, D.C. area 
16% elsewhere
47% retail
14% repair 
10% construction 
10% artistic 
10% financial
1985–1989 50% California 
14% Texas 
12% Washington, D.C. area 
7% New York/New Jersey 
17% elsewhere
31% retail 
24% construction 
10% repair 
9% financial 
5% industrial manufacturing 
1990–1994 57% California 
17% New York/New Jersey 
10% Washington D.C. area 
16% elsewhere
38% retail 
15% construction 
10% repair 
10% financial 
8% industrial manufacturing
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racial groups (see Table 8).The table specifies that the major-
ity of employees in Iranian-owned firms are “white”
Americans. The distinction between “black” and “white”
Americans is noteworthy because in Iran, reference to an
American or a European usually means a “white” person.The
word “foreigner” is rarely applied to Indians, Arabs, or even
Chinese.These ethnic groups are identified by their specific
nationalities and are not viewed as foreigners.
Among Hispanics, Mexicans constituted the majority of
the group;among Far Easterners,Koreans made up the major-
ity of the cluster. Japanese, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have
found employment in delicate works and fine operations.The
most prominent ethnic groups in the “other” category, were
Indians, Pakistanis, Afghans, Egyptians, Moroccan, and some
Europeans.
Who Are the Competitors?
Table 9 demonstrates that little evidence exists in support of
“clannishness” of Iranians. This term refers to adherence to
group norms and hence maintenance of group boundaries
separating insiders from outsiders (Sowell 1995). Only 31
percent of respondents said they view other Iranians as their
important competitors. By contrast, they view the biggest
source of competition (49%) as “white”America.This, as well
as employment of non-Iranians in their establishments, are
clear signs that Iranians do not adhere to a clannish style of
living. Data from Light and Gold (2000) support this state-
ment.They found that in 1989, 47.5 percent of Koreans and
56.7 percent of Iranians in Los Angeles were self-employed.
However, Korean businesses had another 27.6 percent
Koreans working for them, but Iranian businesses had only
another 4.6 percent of Iranians in their employment.
Obviously, Iranians have joined mainstream America.They
have avoided having enclaves—either business or residential.
Their main target is the establishment, not themselves or
other ethnic groups. This comes from both self-confidence,
and pride as evidenced by the additional comments attached
to their questionnaires.
Type of Business Competition
Table 10 shows type and source of business competition.Not
all business areas cause the same level and amount of com-
petitive pressure. Survey respondents view competitors in
their lines of business quite differently. While businesses
involved with industrial production and artistic works view
their competitors as coming from the same ethnic group, 50
percent and 40 percent, respectively, three other businesses
(transportation, research and invention, and construction),
believe competition is coming from “outsiders.”
My interpretation is as follows:A considerable number of
Iranians who migrated to the United States had education,
training, and background in industrial production and manu-
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Table 6. Education Level of the 
Iranian Business Community
Level of Education Percent
Elementary 0.5
High school 17
University (two with doctorate degree) 79
Without response 3.5
Table 7. Reasons for Starting the Business
Reason Very 
Important 
%
Not 
Important 
%
Unemployment 19 59
Availability of capital 21 43
Bored with previous job 24 46
Disappointed with previous job 29 45
Family encouragement 31 41
Have a special expertise 39 33
Hospitable conditions (including dealing with licenses,
employing workers, registering property, getting credit) 
45 12
Accustomed to hard work 73 4
Larger income 74 6
Independence 74 4
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facturing; they were engineers. Also, many migrant Iranians
were artists, writers, and intellectuals. By taking a familiar
path, and pursuing the trade that they were most familiar
with back home, this community of immigrants suddenly
found itself deluged by a large number of engineers and
artists who had concentrated heavily on their own people. In
2006, more than 20 television stations were broadcasting
mainly from Los Angeles in the Persian language, and numer-
ous artists were gradually shifting their focus from only
Persian-speaking markets. On the other hand, some business-
es have found themselves with little or no competition from
other Iranian entrepreneurs.Among them, we can find retail
(mostly grocery stores) with the obvious reason that cus-
tomers cannot find ethnic foods elsewhere but from Iranian-
owned and -managed establishments; repair shops and con-
struction businesses (that I speculate one may not be able to
communicate the issue on hand using the appropriate tech-
nical language in a foreign language).
Economic Importance of Iranian
Entrepreneurs 
According to Josette Shiner, president of Empower America,
the conservative public policy organization cofounded by
1996 Republican Vice Presidential candidate Jack Kemp,“The
view that the main contribution made by immigrants is steal-
ing menial labor jobs from Americans is simply wrong. More
than a third of the high-tech engineers and scientists driving
innovation in Silicon Valley today are immigrants” (Erbe and
Shiner 2000).
A 1998 report by the National Immigration Forum and the
Cato Institute that used the U.S. Census Bureau Current
Population Survey reveals far more benefits than costs to
immigration.The report found that “in their first low-earning
years in the United States, immigrants typically are net drains
on the public coffers, but over time—usually after 10 to 15
years in the United States—they turn into net contributors”
(Preliminary Census Revealed 2007). A previous study con-
ducted by the National Academy of Sciences (Smith and
Edmonston 1997) quantifies this net contribution: immi-
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Table 8. Percentage of Ethnic and Racial
Groups Employed by Iranian Entrepreneurs
Ethnic Group Percent
“White”American 35
Hispanic 27
Far Easterner 6
Others 32
Total 100
Table 9. The Important Groups 
of Competitors
Ethnic Group Percent
“White”Americans 49
Other Iranians 31
Far Easterners 7
Arab 2.5
Indians and Pakistanis 2
Hispanics 2
No response/miscellaneous 6.5
Total 100
Table 10. Type and Source of Business Competition
Type of Activity Among 
Iranians %
Among the
Establishment %
Among Other Groups %
Industrial production 50 50 0
Retail 34 46 20 (varies)
Wholesale 27 27 46 (mostly Arab, Indian, Hispanic)
Financial services 28 32 40 (mostly Arab, Far Easterners)
Transportation 0 65 35 (varies)
Research and 
invention
0 0 100 (varies)
Artistic works 40 35 25 (varies)
Repair 24 44 32 (varies)
Construction 0 50 50 (varies)
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grants contribute roughly $1,800 per person more in taxes
than they receive in public benefits.The reason that state and
local governments sometimes run budget deficits in provid-
ing benefits is that they are responsible for providing most
benefits even though the federal government takes about
two-thirds of these tax dollars.
Some of the significant contributors are Morteza Ejabat (a
Ph. D. Iranian) whose latest venture—Zhone Technologies—
started with an initial investment $700 million; Pier Omidyar
who founded eBay; Kamran Elahian, who has founded six dif-
ferent technology companies; and the famous fashion design-
er, Bijan.
There is a significance in the Iranian business community
relative to other important ethnic groups in the United
States. According to the 1990 Census, about one million
enterprises in the United States belong to ethnic groups.The
total population of those who call themselves Iranian in the
United States, according to the 1990 Census, was 220,000.
The census also reports that 22 percent of Iranians own their
businesses, indicating that 48,400 individuals had a private
business. Some of them are proprietors, some have partners,
and some others have formed corporations. That brings us
very close to my database of addresses (12,000). I used the
information and initially arrived at the conclusion that when
compared with other ethnic groups, Iranians seem to be less
entrepreneurial. By 1990, 79 percent or 9,480 firms (79% x
12,000) of all Iranian businesses that I studied had been
established.These are only 9,480 firms out of one million—
or less than 1 percent (0.00948%). In comparison, Far
Easterners own 5.5 percent and Hispanics possess 1.7 per-
cent of all ethnic businesses (Winston 1991).Then I observed
and compared the figures in a different way and realized that
the importance of the Iranian business community is much
higher than what we observed (see Table 11).
Table 11 shows although Iranians have fewer business
firms in comparison to the two other important ethnic
groups, their total population is also much smaller than the
other groups. As the result, an insignificant percentage
(0.00948) jumps to a respectable 4.3 percent. I conclude that
Iranians are far more “entrepreneurial” than the two other
ethnic groups.
Conclusions
We examined a successful group of entrepreneurs.The exist-
ing literature of entrepreneurship gave us a conceptual
framework. More than 2,000 Iranian entrepreneurs in the
United States were the subject of this research. The study
showed that Iranian entrepreneurs are highly educated and
are active in a wide range of business ventures.They can be
found in 48 states. A large community of Iranians has given
them a base to start a business.Yet, other ethnic groups con-
stitute their customers and increase their chances of survival.
We discovered their reasons, among them independence, for
starting their own businesses. The majority of the Iranian
entrepreneurs had no previous business experience.
This research, like other similar studies, has limitations. If
more than 20 percent had responded to the survey, the gen-
eralization could have been more accurate. Time is another
factor. Information of the past cannot be applicable to the
present. Based on a modified and updated database, I plan to
repeat the survey. Conclusions drawn can then be different
from what is presented here.
Table 11. Economic Importance of Iranian Entrepreneurs
Ethnic Group Total Ethnic
Population
Number of Firms Relative to All
(1,000,000) Firms (%)
Relative to Its Own
Ethnic Group (%)
Iranians 220,000 9,480 0.00948 4.3
Hispanics 7,719,000 17,000 1.7 0.22
Far Easterners 3,514,000 55,000 5.5 1.56
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About 10 years ago the Singapore Government real-ized that entrepreneurial spirit was lacking in itsgeneral population. These conclusions were con-
firmed by an empirical survey, the Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor (GEM), an annual assessment of the nation-
al level of entrepreneurial activity. The paternalistic and
authoritative approach of the government contributed to
the general population’s averseness to participating in risk-
oriented ventures.
Removing impediments to entrepreneurship is a key
challenge for the government and the business sector if the
island republic is to maintain its national competitiveness.
This article explores the various initiatives taken by the
government to stimulate risk-taking and attempts to ascer-
tain if the various measures can be used as key factors to
strengthen the inherent cultural values that stimulate the
entrepreneurial spirit.The observations can serve as a use-
ful tool for academics and managers in recognizing the
cultural traits that influence and help foster entrepreneur-
ial tendencies.
Singapore is a tiny island state with no natural resources save
a hard-working small population of immigrants. It is located
in Southeast Asia between the nations of Malaysia and
Indonesia (see Figure 1) and has thrived as a trading and ship-
ping center since its founding by the British East India
Company’s Sir Stamford Raffles 188 years ago. It covers mere-
ly 650 square kilometers including a few offshore islands. Its
deepwater port served the British well in shipping raw mate-
rials from the region to Europe (Bhasin and Low 2002).
The state was granted self-government by the British in
1959, and in 1963 it joined the Federation of Malaysia only to
be ousted in 1965 when it became an independent republic.
Since then, the country has risen to become “one of the
world’s most prosperous countries with strong international
trading links (its port is one of the world’s busiest in terms of
tonnage handled) and with per capita GDP equal to that of
the leading nations of Western Europe” (CIA: World Factbook
2006) Singapore is now an international city with an
extremely dense population,a largely corruption-free govern-
ment, a skilled and educated workforce, and a successful free
economy where regional and more than 7,000 multinational
companies are major investors. Per capita income has
jumped in 40 years from US$500 to US$25,000, a growth of
50 times multiple. However, certain sectors remain “dominat-
ed by government-linked companies” (U.S. Department of
State 2006).
Since its independence, Singapore has been ruled by one
party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has adopted a
highly controlled form of governance. The government has
been involved in regulating and engineering almost every
facet of society. Many have attributed Singapore’s success to
this autocratic form of public policy and governance.
Singapore’s “miracle” has been somewhat marred by the
realization that entrepreneurial activity in the nation had
been on the decline for decades. This discovery was fully
authenticated by an early Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM) survey in 2000, which lists Singapore very low in
Total Entrepreneurial Activity by Country category (see
Figure 2).
This article sketches the social and economic environ-
ment in Singapore, which may have contributed to stunting
entrepreneurial activity, and outlines the efforts made by the
Singapore government to foster an entrepreneurial culture
through a series of programs aimed at increasing the citi-
zens’ propensity and willingness to take risks. The annual
GEM survey serves as an excellent tool to confirm if the pro-
grams have been successful.This case of Singapore can serve
as a starting point for managers and academics in investigat-
ing the various cultural traits that need to be stimulated to
encourage entrepreneurial activity.
Background: Singapore Inc.
Since independence, the Singapore government has deliber-
ately pursued a policy of active participation in the economy
by setting up “government-linked” companies (GLCs) some
of which are monopolies.
Most of these companies were established in the 1960s
and 1970s to help facilitate building of infrastructure and to
support economic development. In the 1980s and 1990s, this
was further expanded to privatization of government depart-
ments and statutory boards (Singapore Department of
Statistics 2001).The stated rationale for this strategy “was to
compensate for the lack of private sector funds or expertise”
(Ramirez and Tan 2003).
Investment was in key sectors such as manufacturing,
finance, trading, transportation, shipbuilding, and services.
The listing in Table 1 (from Ramirez and Tan 2003) is not
exhaustive but is indicative of the extent of the government’s
involvement.
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As early as 1998, the U.S. Embassy in Singapore published
a report in which it estimated that GLCs accounted for 60
percent of the domestic economy (Restall 2000).This devel-
opment has been viewed as being largely unprogressive
based on the argument that “GLCs tend to do better than pri-
vate sector firms because their institutional relationship with
the government gives them special advantages in terms of
access to funds, tenders, and opportunities; consequently,
they have closed large areas of the economy to the private
sector and stifled entrepreneurship”(Ramirez and Tan 2004).
The conclusion that Ramirez and Tan draw in their paper
for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that though the
Singapore government claims that there is no state interfer-
ence in the GLCs, that they do not receive special privileges
or concealed subsidies, and are allowed to fail if they lose
money, it was found that GLCs were “rewarded in financial
markets with a premium of about 20 percent” (Ramirez and
Tan 2004).
The 2006 Index of Economic Freedom sponsored by the
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal reports that
“Singapore received 22.75 percent of its total revenues from
state-owned enterprises and government ownership of prop-
erty” (Index of Economic Freedom 2006).
By far the biggest commercial vehicle of the Singapore
government is Temasek Holdings, which was established in 
1974 and now has a diversified portfolio of S$129 billion
(approximately US$97.75 billion). The firm is involved in
telecommunications and media, financial services, property,
transportation and logistics, energy and resources, infrastruc-
ture, engineering and technology, as well as pharmaceuticals
and biosciences. The company proudly claims that total
shareholders return since inception is 18 percent com-
pounded annually (Temasek Holdings 2006). The New York
Times recently reported that Temasek companies account for
almost 30 percent of the economy (Arnold 2006).
The company is 100 percent owned by the Singapore
Ministry of Finance. The Chief Executive of Temasek
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Figure 1. Singapore Is a Tiny Nation-State
Located in Southeast Asia 
Source: CIA.The World Factbook, 2006.
Figure 2. Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
by Country 2000 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000. Singapore
Country Report,Center for Management of Innovation and
Technopreneurship (CMIT), National University of Singapore
(NUS), September 25, 2001.
Table 1. Government Investment 
in Key Industry Sectors
DelGro Group TSC1
Intraco Multiindustry
Jurong Shipyard Manufacturing
Keppel Corp. Multiindustry
Keppel Hitachi Zosen Manufacturing
Keppel Marine Industries Manufacturing
NatSteel Multiindustry
Neptune Orient Lines TSC
SembCorp Logistics TSC
Singapore Airlines TSC
Singapore Petroleum Co. Manufacturing
Singapore Press Holdings Manufacturing
Singapore Telecoms TSC
SNO Corp Manufacturing
Times Publishing Manufacturing
1. TSC = Transport, storage, and communication
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(appointed in 2002) is Ho Ching,who is married to Lee Hsien
Loong, the newly elected prime minister of the country and
son of Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew.Forbes mag-
azine cited Ho Ching as number 30 on their List of 100 Most
Powerful Women in the World in 2006 (MacDonald and
Schoenberger 2006).
The second investment arm of the Singapore government
is the Government Investment Corporation (GIC), which
invests Singapore’s foreign reserves totaling more than
US$129 billion. Established in 1981, it operates as a global
fund manager on behalf of the Singapore government. The
board is headed by the founding father of Singapore, Lee
Kuan Yew as chairman.The other members of the board are
all present and past government ministers and include the
current prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, “the same safe
hands who run the other government-owned companies that
make up as much as 60 percent of Singapore’s economy”
(Ellis 2004).
On September 6, 2006, Bloomberg reported that the GIC
manages the world’s seventh-largest currency reserves
(Whitley and Lo 2006). Its portfolio includes real estate, pub-
lic markets, and special investments.The GIC does not pub-
lish the value of its assets and details of its investments are a
state secret.“The fund does not have to file annual reports,
justify profit-and-loss statements, or even report to
Parliament” (Ellis 2004). The Singapore government claims
the secrecy is to ward off “potential speculative attacks on
the Singapore dollar because the foreign reserves are often
used to stabilize the national currency” (Ong 2003).
There have been many calls for the Singapore government
to reduce its participation in private enterprise as well as for
more transparency in its current involvement. The govern-
ment’s position however has remained that if Singaporeans
do not mind then foreigners should not question it. This is
coupled with the premise that government involvement is
necessary to foster growth. As recently as November 2006,
the founding father of modern Singapore, Mentor Minister
Lee Kuan Yew,defended Singapore’s financial secrecy in spite
of demands that they become more accountable.
In 2005 the IMF suggested that “Singapore should reveal
the financial performance of GIC” (Burton 2006a).The Asian
Wall Street Journal also noted that “if the economy is to be
freed up and if entrepreneurs are encouraged to take risks in
order to restore growth, full disclosure about the state’s stew-
ardship of the nation’s wealth is needed” (Restall 2000).The
leading Asian economic publication, Hong Kong’s Far East
Economic Review, reports that there is a price that
Singapore has to pay for its government-led economic model.
“Instead of nurturing a domestic entrepreneurial class with
its own vested interests, it [Singapore] has kept the com-
manding heights of the economy under the control of
Singapore Inc.” (Restall 2006).
Singapore Government’s Authoritarian
Approach
The World Bank has recognized that Singapore is a leading
component of the East Asian “miracle”(Richardson 1997).But
Singapore’s economic success has often been attributed to
the authoritarian or semiauthoritarian political (and econom-
ic) control exercised by the ruling party. The country has
been ruled by a single political party since independence
over 41 years ago.The preferred method of governance has
been to “maximize political cooperation and minimize con-
tention”(Richardson 1997).They have allowed for little or no
opposition in parliament. Opposition is considered to be dis-
ruptive and destructive.Very strict litigation results if anyone
utters what the government considers is “unacceptable” crit-
icism, and foreign journalists and their journals and newspa-
pers are sued for libel in Singapore courts, where the judg-
ment is invariably in the government’s favor.
The government exercises virtually absolute control over
most aspects of society. There is a clear and close relation-
ship between the judiciary, government, and the media. In
addition to a one-party government without opposition, the
state-linked broadcaster,MediaCorp,controls all free TV chan-
nels, and Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. publishes most news-
papers (Yeoh 2005).
The arrangement of GLCs and the GIC provide the
Singapore government and the “ruling PAP, a network of
power relations allowing it social control and political domi-
nance… the resources for social engineering, as well as for
political reward and punishment.The GLCs have tremendous
influence over all Singaporeans’ personal savings, housing,
job opportunities and business contracts” (Rodan 2004).
Christopher Lingle’s (1996) expose on Singapore’s
“authoritarian capitalism” contends that traditional institu-
tions have been used to impose restrictions on individual
freedoms in the pursuit of economic growth (Lingle 1996).
He argues that there has been little outcry against this, as
compared with “authoritarian socialism” when practiced by
totalitarian regimes due to the strong economic performance
exhibited in the Singapore case. The ruling party’s claim of
“Asian democracy” is more of a “phobocracy”—rule-by-fear,
with the insinuation that Western-style democracy needs to
be adjusted to suit the unique Asian milieu, which include
Confucian and other traditional values. Lingle had earlier
refuted these claims as attempts to “foster obedience”(Lingle
1995). This forced collectivism stifles individual innovation
by free-spirited entrepreneurs.
Singapore holds that authoritarian rule is necessary to pro-
mote political stability,which in turn would lead to rapid eco-
nomic development. Lingle, on the other hand, contends that
Singapore’s authoritarian rule has led to the “politicization of
commerce, distribution of economic and commercial privi-
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leges to trusted political supporters” and this has stifled the
emergence of home-grown entrepreneurs (Dorussen 1997).
Singapore’s authoritarianism is further exacerbated by “the
merging of state and party (ruling party the PAP which) has
been paramount in defining and sustaining the authoritarian
regime” (Rodan 2006).
Social Engineering Policy and Monopoly of
Talent 
To achieve national goals of economic development, main-
taining peace and harmony within the multiethnic popula-
tion, and cope with restructuring needs required to compete
in the global marketplace, the Singapore government set
about crafting a culture based on the top-down technocratic
model (Haley and Low 1998). The restructuring of society
meant intervention in all aspects of social life, and this was
based on the following core values as identified and continu-
ously modified by the government (Haley and Low 1998):
1. Community over self
2. Upholding the family as the basic building block of
society
3. Resolving major issues through consensus instead of
contention
4. Stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony
5. Honest government
6. Compassion for the less fortunate
Singapore’s policymakers, under the patriarchal leader-
ship of Lee Kuan Yew, decided that Confucian way reflected
Asian values and would be the guiding light in structuring
the society to ensure survival and success in the changing
global environment.These values include the need for hierar-
chal structures and a compliant and docile society, an emula-
tion of the early Chinese society where the emperor was the
head of the nation (hence the Middle Kingdom—between
heaven and earth) and the father, the head of the family.The
assumption naturally was that these were shared beliefs of
the majority population which are of Chinese origin.
The fundamental precept of Confucian thought is that a
greater emphasis is placed at all times on the community
over the individual.The individual must be sacrificed over the
community. Lam Peng Er (2003) argues that there were four
motivations for the promotion of Asian values by Singapore’s
top Western-educated elites:
1. Propagation of these values would be less controversial,
less divisive, and more acceptable to Singaporeans of all
origins.
2. Promotion of these values would allow for soft-authori-
tarian rule and elites would conveniently wield power
by the consent of the masses.
3.The internalization of these values would inoculate
Singaporeans against the selfish, decadent, and individu-
alism of Western society.
4. Liberal democracy, while suitable to the West, may
divide, destabilize, and ruin Singapore.
The desirable Confucian values were
1. Deep respect for education and a competitive educa-
tion system
2.The best students become scholar-bureaucrats 
3.A meritocratic government whose political leaders are
also top scholars
4.Thrift and hard work 
5. Filial piety
6. A patriarchal society
7. A social contract between the benevolent and virtu-
ous rulers and grateful, respectful, and supportive
subjects
Naturally, promulgation of these meant that it served the
self-interest of the ruling elites in keeping them in power and
denying “political space to their domestic opponents” (Lam
2003). A consequence of this was the implementation of
numerous campaigns aimed at modifying social behavior: no
littering, speak Mandarin, display flags on national day, first
family planning and later procreate more,be courteous,plant
trees, smile more, stop smoking, say no to drugs, stay healthy,
etc. Strong legislation was enacted and implemented to
ensure compliance to these and Singapore carried the label
of being a “fine city.”
Singapore’s education system was originally geared to
meeting the needs of MNCs labor and skills requirements.
The technocratic model that requires students be “streamed”
into various specialized fields begins at an early age.
Educational pathways are stratified according to ability and
aptitude and this has resulted in the creation of a hierarchi-
cal and even elitist society (Ng 2005).The government’s con-
tention has been that streaming prevents waste by reducing
the drop-out rate.
The creation and promotion of a scholar-led bureaucracy
meant that the best and the brightest were recruited to enter
the government.Through the education system and compet-
itive examinations, a scholarship-awarding mechanism was
created to channel top academic brains for political, military,
and business leadership.This, in turn, led to the creation of an
elite ruling class and the monopoly of talent to serve the
needs of the government—and it kept the best from oppos-
ing the ruling party. Almost every cabinet minister and top
bureaucrat in the administrative service, military and police
commanders, the heads of statutory boards, and senior exec-
utives of government-linked companies have come from this
system (Seah 2006a).
The government considers the technocratic approach a
necessity to achieve national goals over a shorter period of
time without too much sidetracking and unnecessary exper-
imentation. Haley and Low contend that the technocratic
approach has resulted in Singaporeans losing its creativity
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and entrepreneurship that the nation so essentially needs
(Haley and Low 1998).
Chew and Chew’s (2003) research confirms that the
public sector has absorbed too much local talent, and this
has created a shortage in the private sector of innovative
and creative individuals capable of assuming this role.The
government needs to gradually release the most capable
human talent that it is presently hoarding (Chew and Chew
2003).
Risk Avoidance Tendency and Lack of
Creativity
Singapore has come a long way from being a labor-abundant
and capital-scarce struggling economy to a labor-scarce and
capital-abundant country. It has also progressed from its early
beginnings as a labor-intensive manufacturing base for inter-
national corporations to a high value-added services-based
center specializing in trading, transportation, finance, and
telecommunications.The country now needs to advance to
the next stage of innovation and creativity to remain compet-
itive (Chia 2005).
The then prime minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong,
acknowledged in his National Day address in 2002 that the
dearth of entrepreneurs is due to an overemphasis on rigid,
structured education, and this stifles creativity and risk-tak-
ing. He noted that studies in the United States have shown
that entrepreneurship is closely related with the level of cul-
tural vibrancy. Studies have also shown that the arts can help
individuals to become more creative in areas beyond the arts.
They are an important source of inspiration and a powerful
avenue for individual expression (Singapore Government
Press Release 2002).
Numerous reasons have been cited to explain the risk-
averse culture in Singapore.Low (2006) in his study of cultur-
al obstacles in growing entrepreneurship in Singapore lists
the following:
1.Young “Singaporeans remain cautious because of what
they have seen, growing up in a PAP dominant land-
scape.” The society was basically very compliant and
lacked a diversity of ideas.
2. Eighty-five percent of focus groups in the study felt that
the educational system had encouraged the learning of
knowledge and facts and not necessarily to be creative.
3. Singaporeans are too “left-brained and textbook orient-
ed” and were a “pampered lot” who had grown up in a
“cushy environment.”This made them less street-smart.
4.There was a “strong reliance on the government to do
things for people.” By force of habit people were led to
thinking that the government would be looking after
them.
5.The social culture considers failure as an embarrass-
ment. “Kiasusim is a bane; being kiasu worsens
Singapore’s entrepreneurial situation.” People are con-
cerned about the “face” or “standing in their own
group.” In other countries failure is more acceptable as
it is considered a process of learning.
A very recent debate highlighted the fact that
Singaporeans were good at academics but lacked street
smarts. They fall short on individual initiative and rely too
much on the government for help. Singaporeans, it was felt,
functioned well only as a group, not as individuals; they were
not capable of being nonconformist or of standing out above
the crowd.The fault, it was claimed, lay in years of political
and social conditioning by a top-down government, which
was efficient but paternalistic. Everything was so structured
that people did not need to fight for a living, and this blunt-
ed their ability to compete. One could keep the people’s
compliance by “keeping their stomach full and their mind
empty” (Seah 2006b).
Programs to Stimulate Entrepreneurship 
One key requirement for fostering an entrepreneurial culture
is the “removal of all barriers, particularly those created by
government or within its power to change, that block or dis-
courage people’s entrepreneurship” (Davis 2002).
In preparing for Singapore’s entry into the 21st century,
the government included the need to develop and foster an
entrepreneurial environment in its Master Plan, aptly named
‘SME21’—reflecting the efforts to stimulate high-tech small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) moving away from the earli-
er focus on MNCs and larger corporations. Earlier in 1999 it
had already launched the Technopreneurship 21 (T21) pro-
gram, which was designed to develop entrepreneurship
involving technology and innovation. An Economic Review
Committee was formed in December 2001 to develop the
necessary goals and strategies.
Singapore already had a pro-business environment but no
protection was accorded to small businesses and SMEs,
which naturally could not compete with larger and well-
established corporations (Tan 2003).
1. Start-ups and SMEs did not have adequate access to cap-
ital, though the financial sector was highly liberalized
and developed. Banks did not specifically focus on the
financial needs of smaller enterprises (Tan 2003).
2. No provisions were at hand to help entrepreneurs com-
pete in an environment of globalization, even though
Singapore had been ranked as the third most “global-
ized” country by A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine
Index 2001 (Tan 2003).
3. Entrepreneurs felt that they were victims of overregula-
tion and the high costs of fees and licenses they were
required to comply with.
Consequently, a concerted effort was made by the
Singapore authorities to make the changes necessary to rec-
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tify the prevailing situation and a number of programs were
created.
In March 2000, a $10 million fund, called The Enterprise
Challenge (TEC), was set up to sponsor innovative proposals
that encourage creativity, innovation, and enterprise through
the provision and improvement of public services.
Entrepreneurship Assistance
Entrepreneurship Assistance provisions were created to
encourage and support local enterprises.The following agen-
cies were set up to promote entrepreneurial activity:
• Singapore Productivity Innovation and Growth (SPRING
Singapore) is the first stop for all entrepreneurs. Its
objectives are to promote a pro-business environment,
to champion industry development, to enhance enter-
prise capabilities, and to market access and opportuni-
ties. Services provided include standards and research,
patent information, current awareness, online informa-
tion, and a technical library.
• Enterprise One Singapore (EnterpriseOne) helps local
enterprises find the answers they need to start, sustain,
and grow their businesses.
• Singapore Entrepreneurs (SGentrepreneurs) is a public
site for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and business
plan competition organizers to “blog” about their expe-
riences in entrepreneurship and enterprise in
Singapore.
• International Enterprise Singapore (IE Singapore) is
responsible for taking enterprises abroad.
• Agency for Science and Technology Research (A*Star)
fosters scientific research and exploitation of technolo-
gy through incubators.
• Action Community for Entrepreneurship (ACE) is a
change agent in building a more pro-enterprise environ-
ment through: facilitating discussion and debate on the
regulatory framework; changing culture and mindset;
improving access to finance; and facilitating networking
and learning.
Entrepreneurship Incentives
Entrepreneurship Incentives were introduced to encourage
as well as remove obstacles that were preventing entrepre-
neurial activity. Incentives include:
• Tax exemption for start-ups. A special tax incentive was
introduced for start-ups in Singapore where they are not
required to pay tax on the first S$100,000 of chargeable
income (excluding Singapore franked dividends) for any
of the first three years of tax assessment falling within
year of assessment 2005 to 2009.
• Government tax incentive schemes. Such schemes
include the Double Tax Deduction (DTD) for Market
Development, a tax incentive offered to Singapore com-
panies to expand their overseas markets. Under this
scheme, companies are allowed to deduct twice the
amount of allowable expenses incurred in approved
projects from their taxable income. The DTD for
Overseas Investment Development Expenditure is a tax
incentive to encourage exploration of overseas invest-
ment opportunities, enhance their competitiveness, and
expand their operations in foreign markets.
• Government financing programs. Special schemes
include Local Enterprise Finance Scheme (LEFS), fixed
interest rate financing programs designed to encourage
and assist local enterprises to upgrade, strengthen, and
expand their operations; the Micro Loan Program (MLP),
a fixed interest rate financing program under LEFS
designed to help the very small local enterprises gain
better access to financing;Variable Interest Loan Scheme
(V-Loan), the Loan Insurance Scheme (LIS), which com-
plements the existing LEFS scheme. It provides an addi-
tional form of financing for SMEs by allowing more flex-
ibility for financial institutions to package attractive loan
facilities to SMEs based on their risk profile and the
Local Enterprise Technical Assistance Scheme (LETAS), a
scheme to help local enterprises defray the cost of
engaging an external expert for a limited period of time
to modernize and upgrade their operations. The
Overseas Enterprise Incentive (OEI) is designed to
encourage and support local enterprises to penetrate
new markets, explore new business opportunities, and
find new avenues for resources and technology. It allows
the qualifying companies to be exempted from taxation
for income arising from overseas investments, such as
dividends, royalties, interest income on shareholder
loans, incremental income from provision of support
services, and overseas project income. Finally, the
Revised Overseas Investment Incentive (OII) is a tax
incentive to help Singapore-based companies interna-
tionalize their operations. It is designed to encourage
Singapore-based companies to expand their operations
overseas by allowing them to defer taxes due from prof-
itable operations in Singapore.
• Economic Development Board (EDB) Start-up
Enterprise Development Scheme (EDB SEEDS). This
matched equity financing scheme is administered by
EDB to foster entrepreneurship and innovation activities
in Singapore. Start-ups can apply for SEEDS equity
financing when they are in their early stages. Every dol-
lar raised by a start-up from third-party investors will be
matched by EDB up to a maximum of S$300,000.Third-
party investors must put in a minimum of S$75,000
each. Both EDB and the third-party investors will take
equity stakes in the company in proportion to their
investments.
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• SPRING SEEDS. Nontechnology start-ups can apply for
SPRING SEEDS equity financing when they are in their
early stages. Every dollar raised by a start-up from third-
party investors will be matched by SPRING Singapore
up to a maximum of S$300,000. Third-party investors
must put in a minimum of S$50,000 cumulative. Both
SPRING Singapore and the third-party investors will
take equity stakes in the company in proportion to
their investments.
• Enterprise Investment Incentive (EII) Scheme. This
tax-incentive scheme allows investors in innovative
start-ups to deduct their investment loss amount
against their taxable income.With EII status, a start-up
can issue certificates to its investors for investment of
up to S$3 million. Investors with these certificates can
deduct any investment loss from their taxable income.
• Growth Financing Program. This program is designed
to support early stage, Singapore-based companies that
have the potential to become global competitive enter-
prises. Companies that have successfully completed
their product development with early customer trac-
tion can apply for equity financing for earnest overseas
market expansion activities through the Growth
Financing Program. Potentially, every S$2 raised by the
growth company from third-party investors will be
matched by S$1 from EDB, subject to a maximum of
S$1,000,000 under both the SEEDS and Growth
Financing Programs. Minimum investment from third-
party investors is S$500,000. Both EDB and the third-
party investors will take equity stakes in the company
in proportion to their investments.
• ACE’s Action Crucible for Financing Scheme. This
scheme is one of four action crucibles formed under
the Action Community for Entrepreneurship (ACE)
to improve SMEs’ access to financing, as part of the
impetus to foster greater entrepreneurship in
Singapore.
• Home Office Scheme. In this scheme, which is
designed to facilitate entrepreneurship, Housing and
Development Board (HDB) subsidized apartments can
be used as a home office and for business registration.
• Local Enterprise Technical Assistance Scheme. This
scheme will subsidize (up to 50%) the cost of hiring a
consultant to implement quality management and IT
systems (e.g., upgrading computer systems or ISO
projects).
• Patent Application Fund Plus. Designed to encourage
investors to patent innovations and commercialize their
inventions, this scheme offers help on covering some of
the costs of filing patent applications, such as profes-
sional and official fees and other related charges of
patent filing.
Entrepreneurship Education 
• National University of Singapore (NUS) Entrepreneur-
ial Center. This center offers a wide range of entrepre-
neurship courses for all undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents, to raise awareness and interest in entrepreneur-
ship among the NUS community and to conduct cutting-
edge research on key issues of entrepreneurship.
• Entrepreneurs Resource Center (ERC). The ERC pro-
vides specialized training programs that are tailor-made
for the business environment, as well as specially crafted
curriculum with a unique approach of integrating real-
life experience and case studies to refine business and
professional skills. ERC emphasizes a holistic approach
to encourage entrepreneurship
Amending Legislation that Stigmatizes
Failure
The arcane bankruptcy law was amended to encourage
entrepreneurship.Previously a bankrupt person could be dis-
charged only after paying most of his or her debt.The amend-
ments in 1995 and 1999 now allow the Official Assignee to
grant a discharge for debts below S$500,000 after three years
in bankruptcy.The amount of debt for which bankruptcy pro-
ceedings may be instituted was raised to S$10,000.The peri-
od during which a debtor can attempt to arrange a settle-
ment was raised to 45 days (Tan 2003).
Creativity and Innovation
Creativity and innovation are officially encouraged and fos-
tered with the introduction of several initiatives, including
the establishment of Creative Community Singapore, an ini-
tiative to provide opportunities for Singaporeans to express
their creativity and deploy their creative energy for commu-
nity benefit, to evolve a creative and connected community
where arts, culture, business, and technology converge to
empower and engage individuals.
Education Reform: Changing the Mindset
Singapore’s school system has been based on the concept of
meritocracy based on progress for those with ability and tal-
ent. For many, their future is determined at the age of 12
through the streaming exams.The result has been an empha-
sis on rote learning instead of critical thinking and the cre-
ation of a skilled,but compliant workforce.No opportunity is
given to slow learners or late bloomers. Parents have also
complained that the system stigmatizes some children early
on as failures (Burton 2006b).
Realizing that the education system needs to be adjusted
to allow for creative thinking as well as developing individual
abilities, the government is now trying to loosen up and
encourage creative thinking. A number of government meas-
ures are under consideration for implementation. A review
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committee recently concluded the need to change the mind-
set though the education system and recommended that
“Singapore’s education formula needs to move from unifor-
mity to diversity, from rigidity to flexibility, from conformity
to resilience, and from molding to empowering” (FitzPatrick
2003).
Changes need to be made to the exam and skill-oriented
system from focus on raw grades to fostering creativity and
innovativeness.The focus at all levels will now be to nurture
flexible mindsets, shift emphasis from teacher to learner, and
“transform from being just a productive society into a cre-
ative and risk-taking society” (FitzPatrick 2003).
Loosening Reigns to Foster
Entrepreneurship
The first step to dealing with any issue is recognizing the
problem. Singapore authorities have conceded that a dire
need exists for building a class of entrepreneurs who will
take the national economy to greater heights.This must main-
ly be done by the private sector but the government must
ensure that a climate for innovation,creativity, and risk-taking
exists. Many government leaders have stated that they are
willing to allow for dissent and reduction of controls.
Although much publicity was generated in the last 10 years
that this was going to be done, this has been mainly lip serv-
ice. Just recently in 2006 strong action was taken to prevent
protests at the World Bank and IMF meetings held in
Singapore and now new legislation is being planned to stop
Internet blogs from criticizing the government.
Net Result: Decrease and Increase in
Entrepreneurial Activity
The first GEM study (circa 2000) on the level of entrepre-
neurial activities in Singapore found it to be relatively low in
comparison with the other countries. Singapore was ranked
17 out of 21 on the total entrepreneurial activity (TEA)
index. The biggest impediment factors reported was the
value orientation of the people—preferring to work for larg-
er, established organization and fear of failure (GEM 2000).
The level of TEA improved substantially from 27 out of 29
nations in 2001 to 21 out of 37 nations in 2002, although the
total entrepreneurial propensity for 2002 declined in com-
parison to 2001. The two most important dimensions that
required improvement were social and cultural norms and
barriers to entry (GEM 2002).There was a further decline in
2003 and the main reason cited was the occurrence of the
SARS crisis, a viral infection that plagued most Southeast
Asian nations.“Cultural values” continued to receive low rat-
ings (GEM 2003).
The year 2004 saw the first major rise in TEA to 5.7 per-
cent from 5.0 percent in 2003. Singapore’s relative ranking
among the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development and East Asian countries improved slightly
from 14 of 21 in 2003 to 11 of 21 in 2004.
Improvements were reported in the following dimen-
sions:
1. Effectiveness of R&D transfer
2.Availability of capital
3. Government policy support
4.Access to physical infrastructure
5. Effectiveness of university, management education, and
training
Lower ratings for Singapore were in the following areas:
1. Effectiveness of primary and secondary education and
training
2. Rapidity of change in markets
3. Market accessibility
4. Social and cultural barriers
Singapore saw the highest increase in TEA in 2005 (up
from 5.7% to 7.2%) since it began participating in GEM in
2000. This increase outpaced that of the developed OECD
countries. The country was ranked 8 of 20. Improvements
were reported in the following dimensions:
1. Regulation and taxation system
2. Government policy support
3. Market accessibility
Areas in which Singapore was rated lower were:
1. Effectiveness of university education and training
2. Business service effectiveness
3.Availability of capital
4. Social and cultural barriers
Table 2 summarizes the changes in TEA and country rank-
ing for the years 2000 to 2005.
The constant lower ratings have been on social and cultur-
al barriers.The GEM 2001 Executive Report clarifies that this
is the most pressing issue and describes it as the “public’s
general attitude towards entrepreneurship.” In nearly every
country, this was found to be the greatest inhibitor to, or
enhancement of, entrepreneurship. GEM specialists agreed
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Table 2. TEA for Singapore 2000–2005
Year TEA (%) Country Ranking
2000 2.1 17 of 21
2001 6.6 27 of 29
2002 5.9 21 of 27
2003 5.0 14 of 21
2004 5.7 11 of 20
2005 7.2 8 of 20
Source: GEM 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.
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that a society’s negative posture with respect to creativity,
innovation, and change significantly reduces the number of
people engaged in starting new firms.The experts were also
clear that a culture that rewards risk-taking is more inclined
to support higher levels of entrepreneurial activity.
Willingness to accept failure also tends to be associated with
higher levels of risk-taking (GEM 2001).
Conclusion: More Can and Needs to be Done
The Economist (UK) ranks Singapore 84 among 167 coun-
tries in its 2007 Democracy Index.The index was developed
by The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Singapore is listed
as a hybrid regime (mixture of authoritarian and democratic
elements) and ranks well below Finland (6), Malaysia (81),
Hong Kong (75),Taiwan (32), and Indonesia (65).The index
looks at 60 indicators across the five categories: electoral
process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of gov-
ernment, political participation, and political culture
(Economist 2006).
In its Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders
ranked Singapore 146 out of 167 countries surveyed for
press freedom. At the top of the list were Finland, Iceland,
Ireland, and the Netherlands while North Korea was last
(Press Freedom Index 2006).
It is clear from both reports that Singapore needs to do
much more in loosening its reigns of the population for them
to feel comfortable in a free society and become more will-
ing to take risks. The basic fact remains that in the current
Singapore business environment, the societal culture is anti-
thetical to the entrepreneurial spirit.
A business venture is a contradictory dynamics between
risk and risk awareness. A business that is purely based on
risk is an irrational undertaking.The ideal business venture is
one that reflects the following:
Risk > Risk Awareness 
Unfortunately in Singapore, the formula is reversed:
Risk Awareness > Risk
In the United States, it has been concluded that entrepre-
neurs do not consider themselves to be risk-takers. “They
have weighed the pros and cons and convinced themselves
that their so called risky idea isn’t that risky after all” (Boyett
2001). The paradox of risk is that you cannot afford not to
take it.“Nobody knows more about risk and how to live with
it than entrepreneurs” (Wacker 2001).
Risk averseness can be described as the unwillingness to
take risk due to the inherent fear of failure. It is an attitude
that promotes “playing it safe” in line with the oft-repeated
adage“you can’t do wrong if you do nothing!”which natural-
ly results in absolute minimization of any risk factors. In the
Oriental world, fear of failure is further reinforced by the
need to save “face.”
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Table 3. Democracy Index 2007: The Economist Intelligence Unit
Full Democracies Rank Flawed Democracies Rank Hybrids             Rank
Sweden 1 South Korea 31 Albania 83
Iceland 2 Taiwan 32 Singapore 84
Netherlands 3 India 35 Madagascar 85
Norway 4 Philippines 63 Lebanon 85
Denmark 5 Indonesia 65
Finland 6 Bangladesh 75
Luxembourg 7 Hong Kong 78
Australia 8 Malaysia 81
Canada 9
Switzerland 10
Source: http://singaporeelection.blogspot.com/2006/11/shameful-democracy-for-singapore.html.
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Kreiser, Marino, and Weaver’s 2002 study empirically
proves that national culture has a direct and identifiable
impact on the level of entrepreneurial behavior. The study
utilized data from 1,070 firms in six countries to assess the
impact of national culture on entrepreneurial orientation.
The impact of culture was examined on two key dimensions:
risk-taking and proactive behavior. Their argument suggests
that by changing the “predominant cultural values in a given
society, policy makers can act as a catalyst to entrepreneurial
development” (Kreiser, Marino, and Weaver 2002).
Singapore’s success and weakness lies in this setup.
Entrepreneurship is a result of two interdependent factors:
1.A vibrant culture that is willing to take risk and values
the freedom of risk, and
2.A social system that channels and rewards the risk-tak-
ers so that society as a whole can benefit from the tal-
ent in due time.
A society that has traditionally focused attention on “con-
trol” rather than “free spirit”when confronted with the “new
economy” has extreme difficulty in reducing the controls
and increasing the free spirit. This is the key factor that
destroys entrepreneurial spirit in any economy, and is the
dilemma between “security” and “risk.” The choice for
Singapore is obvious.A truly entrepreneurial culture is built
around accepting failure as commonplace and risks contin-
ue to be taken because there is little to lose.This may not be
the case for Singapore where most citizens are simply too
well off and cozy.
Financial incentives, tax breaks, and infrastructure
improvements do certainly lead to increase in entrepreneur-
ial activity, as is the case in Singapore. But a desire for true
innovation, creativity, experimentation, and multiple oppor-
tunities in education cannot be realized until the state allows
civil society to flourish and avoids politicizing dissent (Tan
and Gopinathan 2000). As long as the Singapore government
is unwilling to allow natural forces to prevail, allow open
expression and free flow of ideas, and encourage out-of-the-
box thinking that will unveil the creative and innovative
energies that currently are dormant, only limited progress in
fostering an entrepreneurial culture can be expected.
Postscript
The GEM Survey for 2006 was released after completion of
this article but before publication date. Results released on
February 9, 2007 show that Total Entrepreneurial Activity
(TEA) went down from 7.2 percent in 2005 to 4.9 percent in
2006, placing Singapore 16 among the 22 members of the
OECD that were surveyed (Strait Times 2007).
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T he argument that the board of directors can be ahelpful tool for entrepreneurships and small busi-nesses derives from the rationale for using boards
from both a macro and a micro perspective.Society depends
on boards to provide overall checks and balances in the
running of businesses.This could not be more evident from
the role of the board in Enron’s collapse (U.S. Senate 2002).
The board’s value to the entrepreneur is found in the
application of the micro perspective.Two sets of recommen-
dations are developed to formulate an improved model of
directorship actions and behaviors. First, duties and
responsibilities of the board of directors are expanded to
help guide entrepreneurs.Second, five unique behavior pat-
terns are then proposed that can be particularly helpful in
carrying out the duties and activities of the board for guid-
ing entrepreneurial success.
The overall thesis that arises from this research is that work-
ing advisory boards and boards of directors could not only be
helpful but instrumental in strategic planning for entrepre-
neurs and small businesses.To accomplish this goal, the tradi-
tional role of the board of directors is expanded, especially to
address and respond to the needs of entrepreneurs and small
businesses. Five behavior constructs are proposed to provide
a model of the entrepreneurial director. Three key behavior
patterns underlie each construct. The model is proposed to
stretch current boardroom practices to better serve entrepre-
neurs and small business managers.
Research Design
During the past 25 years, the author has coordinated 100 stu-
dent research and consulting teams, directed at improving
entrepreneur and small business problems and opportunities.
Several of the studies investigated business opportunities for
not-for-profit institutions,such as devising improved strategies
for a gift shop in a local museum. For each entrepreneurial
client, senior business students at a Midwestern university
were assigned to investigate, analyze, and suggest improve-
ments of the entrepreneurs’ strategic and tactical issues over
a four-month period. The author also conducted interviews
and conversations with the entrepreneurs that focused on
their problems and how well they were able to respond to
opportunities. The consulting teams’ recommendations and
the author’s impressions consistently find that many issues
seriously hamper the planning processes in these businesses.
Corporate Governance: The Macro
Requirement
From a macro perspective, corporate governance can impact
the nation’s financial stability,which in turn,will affect its eco-
nomic performance.Therefore, it is prudent to enthusiastical-
ly promote good corporate governance to fight against finan-
cial fraud and to win the publics’ confidence in our institu-
tions.When the public was recently asked about their ability
to trust companies in providing complete and accurate finan-
cial information,roughly 42 percent lacked trust in such infor-
mation.Further,when the public was asked if boards of direc-
tors are effective at managing executive compensation, 57
percent of respondents with college degrees disagreed
(Bright 2006).
Corporate scandals have contributed trillions of dollar loss-
es in the United States.Many of these scandals were the result
of shifting power in favor of the CEO and other high-ranking
officers and away from boards of directors.As a result of these
misdeeds, we are entering a period of government impact of
boards of directors and a rethinking of making boards more
effective (Donaldson 2003). Further, good corporate gover-
nance can reduce the number of investors who trust false
financial information and make incorrect investment deci-
sions (Shen, Hsu, and Chen 2006).
Directors of large corporations often rely on hired counsel
to conduct independent investigations for the board.This was
reported to be the case both at Enron and Tyco.Yet both rat-
ing agencies and other investigators can miss parts of the
truth (Chanos 2006), which are important for the investing
public to make wise decisions.Society must be able to rely on
directors to be true stewards of corporate governance.They
must define a philosophy and culture of ethics to guide cor-
porate management that will permeate businesses, society,
and culture. By making a strong commitment to ethics,
accountability, and shareholder interests, boards will gain and
strengthen investor confidence in society’s business institu-
tions. On a macro perspective, it is society’s confidence that
builds a stronger economy.
Corporate Governance: The Micro
Requirement
Managers from medium-size and larger companies that move
into entrepreneurial roles quickly encounter a different busi-
ness world than they were once familiar with.The entrepre-
neur has to be all things to all people,which requires making
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decisions much of the time within the total value chain.
Entrepreneurial lives are full of small problem distractions.
They have to do things constantly that are beneath execu-
tives in larger size institutions. There is a lack of influence,
prestige, and public recognition for the entrepreneur that is
expected and achieved in the executive suite.The entrepre-
neur’s problems are unnervingly vulnerable; for example, the
loss of one customer could often be a serious problem.
Further, they have little control over their time; there are
always interruptions (Schroder 2006). As their business
becomes successful, it can become easy to overlook any of
the following deadly errors:
• Forget to remit payroll taxes on schedule.
• Fail to document the justification underpinning the dis-
missal of an employee.
• Allow the company’s liability insurance to lapse.
• Neglect to report sales usage tax.
• Verbally grant employee incentive options during an
informal luncheon meeting (Levangie 2004).
A board of directors seems especially useful to the entre-
preneur in the following applications.
The Responsibility for Providing Direction
and Advice
Seasoned wisdom from the board can present “the big picture”
to the owners. Entrepreneurs and small business managers
need guidance in developing a future for their businesses.
The Responsibility for Providing Support
Many entrepreneurs and small businesspeople have no one
other than themselves to rely upon. By having a board, they
can feel comfortable and gain confidence from people who
have a track record of successful business experiences in
their career.
Going Public
If a new entrepreneur or small company is successful, it may
aspire to go public. Independent boards are helpful in meet-
ing stock exchange requirements. Further, board members
can add credibility to the business by associating with it and
through their connections.
Succession Questions
Many family-owned companies that emerged after World War
II are going to be facing succession questions. A board can
help derive a good succession plan and provide rationale to
conflicting parties about the succession of the small business.
Financial Guidance
Entrepreneurships and small businesses often experience
cash and capital problems.A board’s vision and planning can
help moderate issues resulting from cash flow problems.
Networking
Many board members can help think of sources of potential
capital and make other links that are very useful to a small
business or entrepreneur (Buss 1996).
Legitimacy and Reputation Building
Reputable independent directors can help establish the legit-
imacy that new entrepreneurship’s often lack. Successful
individuals can act as a signaling mechanism in the develop-
ment of the entrepreneurship’s reputation in its environment
(Deutsch and Ross 2003).
Developing the Entrepreneurial Director
Boardroom members and researchers are making a case for
the board to evolve a new set of duties and skills, especially
for entrepreneurships (Dorado and Molz 2005).
It is a very difficult challenge to focus on the operating
mechanisms of business institutions that require a high level
of specialization to assess and determine objectively how
effective that specialization is. It is the directors who are in
the best position to question and affirm or deny the progress
and direction of institutional development.
This research suggests the following duties for continuing
the expansion of the evolutionary role of the board of direc-
tors in guiding the nation’s entrepreneurs and small busi-
nesses.
Meeting with Shareholders
In the past, directors had limited contact with shareholders.
Given the state of conditions facing boards today, it is sug-
gested that boards meet and talk with shareholders.To date,
both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New
York Stock Exchange have not mandated that boards meet
with shareholders. The board of directors could attend an
annual meeting with shareholders without internal manage-
ment present to discuss shareholder issues and obtain their
impressions of how the entrepreneurship is performing
(Whitehouse 2006).
Discussions with Employees
Directors must learn to do more listening and devote more
time to listening to employees. In the past, directors have not
had access to employees. Meeting with employees can give
directors a sense of how dedicated employees are toward
pursuing company goals. Equally important, directors can get
a sense of how employees feel about management
(Whitehouse 2006).
Too many managers view the workforce as a cost to be
controlled.The employees invest their human capital in the
companies they work for. The board should encourage and
support their voice in corporate governance (Kochan 2006).
Directors should exercise their rights to visit company facili-
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ties during work hours and have conversations with employ-
ees without internal management present.
Evaluating Each Other’s Performance
Much of the boards’ time is spent interacting with manage-
ment and in interacting with each other.The idea of having
periodic board reviews could help to change board behavior
in a variety of ways. The performance evaluation of each
board member will cause directors to become much more
serious about performing well because a written opinion and
conclusion is made about their board success and effective-
ness. It could modify feedback, make directors more serious
in their preparation for board meetings,and make them more
serious when serving on committees (Wei 2006). Board
members should be peer reviewed every three years to sum-
marize their contributions to the entrepreneurship and their
impact on the company.
Strategizing the Business
When there are no easy road maps to follow for guiding busi-
ness activities, the board can help strategically to monitor
and guide the entrepreneur into the future.When the board
of directors has independent leadership, that is leadership
other than the CEO, it tends to perform better in corporate
strategy (Lawler and Finegold 2005).The board of directors
must find the energy, industry, savvy, and ability to help mold,
approve, and test the strategic plan for the entrepreneurship
or small business.This requires that several board members
have deep industry experience and to help the board to set
a strategic course (Carey and Patsalos-Fox 2006).The board
of directors provides the momentum in the strategic plan-
ning process that keeps managers and employees tracking
toward their long-range goals.
The board of directors is capable of defining three ele-
ments of strategy (Frery 2006) for the entrepreneur:
1. The Why of Strategy. The first element of strategy to be
conducted by the board is to define the entrepreneur’s
ability to increase customer value beyond a reasonable
cost.
2. The How of Strategy. The second element of strategy to
be accomplished by the board for the entrepreneur is
to define how the strategy is going to be accomplished.
The board will explore benchmarking, differentiation,
core competencies, and other creative and imitative
methods that will help mutate and evolve a new busi-
ness model.
3. The What of Strategy. The third task of the board in
designing a strategy for the entrepreneur is to define
the capabilities, limits, and scope of the strategy. The
board should help set the guidelines by examining
diversification, new markets, vertical integration, out-
sourcing, and other techniques that stretch the hori-
zons for the entrepreneur and determine the impact of
the positioning.
Evolving New Cross-Functional
Relationships
Many strategic failures during the past 15 years can be traced
to an excessive focus on identifying and concentrating on
narrow core competencies.This trend was not practiced by
companies that took special interest beyond their core com-
petencies, such as paying close attention to quality control,
and managing and controlling their distribution networks.
Good examples of companies that went way beyond their
core competencies are Avon, Harley Davidson, Starbucks,
Sherman Williams, Dell, and Caterpillar (Thomas and
Wilkonsan 2006). The board of directors can help envision
beyond just the core competencies by integrating cross-func-
tional components such as sales transaction data, product
specification data, channel partner data, product line data,
consumer behavior data,and many other data components to
design new intersection points that translate into new strate-
gies. Intersection points are evolved into networks for mak-
ing things happen (Forsyth, Galante, and Guild 2006).Thus,
the entrepreneurial board is in a pivotal position for engag-
ing in the development of cross-functional relationships for
developing integrated strategies that capitalize on intersect-
ing insights.
Practicing Servant Directorship
The entrepreneurial director is servant first, director second.
These directors view themselves as public servants, a natural
inclination that the board member wants to give service to
his or her company (Martin 2006). This requires that they
find an important task to perform as director and that they
get engaged in the process of accomplishing it. This could
take the form of helping create new division or department
goals, writing plans, auditing part of the company, collecting
census data on population growth trends, and a host of other
tasks.These tasks must directly relate to the goals of the com-
pany and fall into the sphere of work that the board can
accomplish.This work should augment management's tasks
and goals. The criteria to become a servant director have
been well developed by Greenleaf (1977) who set up a train-
ing center for servant leadership (Greenleaf Center 2007).
1.To bring their institutions to a distinguished level of per-
formance.
2.To design the leadership of the institution as a group of
equals.
3.To define the institution.
4.To state the purposes and goals of the institution.
5.To learn what they need to know in order to oblige the
institution to reach distinction.
6.To have a total understanding of the institution.
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7.To have a caring attitude for all the persons touched by
the institution, especially caring for those persons in
proportion to their involvement in and dependence on
the institution.
The Entrepreneurial Director Model
The evolving duties of the board in serving the entrepreneur
require a higher level of involvement and commitment than
just preparing and attending 10 meetings per year and voting
on issues. It involves knowing the trends and opportunities
facing the business, assembling data collection points, and
processing data to glean intelligence from information. It fur-
ther involves helping to evolve a strategy and to negotiate
and guide the entrepreneurship through each window of
opportunity.To perform the above evolving duties and tackle
the issues, problems, and opportunities facing entrepreneur-
ships,a model is developed,comprised five behavior patterns
(Aquinas 1990 version) that are found to provide a good tar-
geted fit for performing the duties and expectations required
by entrepreneurial directors.
Charitable
Entrepreneurial directors have to be more charitable than
their larger corporate counterparts. Charitable directors are
those that give freely their time and talents to the company,
its employees, and other board members. These directors
become ready to respond to management’s needs in getting
work accomplished.They accomplish projects as well as pro-
vide the traditional guidance, coaching, and mentoring to
evolve effective company performance.Good target behavior
examples of director charitableness are the following:
1. Charitable directors express an innate desire to give
more to the company for which they are a board mem-
ber than they will take from it.
2. Charitable directors know that they are going to strive
at imparting new initiatives into the lives of the compa-
nies for which they serve as board members.
3. Charitable directors spend the time and energy in show-
ing management, supervisors,and employees how some
units or segments of the business will be refocused
today to build a better tomorrow.
Patience
The entrepreneurial board must invest in patient capital for
the entrepreneur. It involves a forbearance and vigilance over
the entrepreneur’s asset base coupled with a strategy that is
accruing economic activity. The board needs to evolve and
practice a capacity of calm endurance, hope, and trust as
business activities pass through a series of economic condi-
tions, obstacles, and trials for achieving success. Good target
behaviors that provide examples of directorship patience
include the following:
1. Board members provide special encouragement to
slower developing and less productive employees and
managers.
2. Board members induce colleagues to come aboard.
They convince employees, investors, and others to buy
into the entrepreneurial plan and the board’s plan.
3. Patient directors refrain from using luck to any extent.
Guiding entrepreneurial performance is not a game of
chance; it is the guidance of performance activities and
the setting up of checkpoints to assess the degree of
goal achievement of these activities.
Humility
Achieving status or a next promotion are poor reasons for
joining a board. Humble directors will deflect attention away
from them and shun the limelight.They quietly focus atten-
tion on the tasks at hand. Board meetings become a poor
place for ego trips and personality clashes. These directors
must learn to disregard their status and ego in accomplishing
board work and attending board meetings. They are much
more plow horse than show horse (Collins 2001). Several tar-
get behaviors developed to encourage director humility are
the following:
1. Board members refrain from seeking titles and status.
Directors who seek the value of titles and status are less
likely to focus on issues for their own benefit rather
than for benefit of their company. Status will normally
accrue as a result of improving entrepreneurial perform-
ance and effectiveness.
2. Board members recognize and admit errors. A board
and management that develop and implement strategies
are not going to be right 100 percent of the time. A
board that admits error will learn to observe feedback
closely and grow in strength and confidence.
3. Board members seek criticism.The board acts as man-
agement’s “window to the world.” By seeking criticism,
the board can understand new viewpoints, evolve bet-
ter strategies, and maintain a better understanding of
their role in providing guidance as a “window to the
world.”
Values
Entrepreneurial board members must strive to seek and dis-
play a set of values or absolutes to all members of the busi-
ness.Values comprise the belief system of each board mem-
ber. Hard work, punctuality, concern for others, honesty, and
the importance of life are important boardroom values.They
need to signal their determination in safeguarding assets and
improving performance and effectiveness of the company for
which they are a board member.
The roles of entrepreneurial directors are defined to
encourage a higher degree of involvement when compared
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to that of their larger corporate counterparts. A closer
interaction with managers, employees, and shareholders
allows them the opportunity to display their values to
these groups. Target behaviors that help define and perme-
ate values are the following:
1. Board members display integrity. Integrity is first a
wholeness that contains the parts of the person that
qualifies them to be a director and, second, it is an
inclination of a director to apply a high standard of
morals to the entrepreneurship. Mature directors real-
ize that integrity is a journey, not a destination to be
reached. Directors must lead in displaying integrity.
2. Board members never cheat the system a little.
Directors have an opportunity to know what the busi-
ness is involved in, to act on inside information for
them, and to obtain contracts for their own compa-
nies. By adhering to strict guidelines and honesty, they
will send the signal that it does not pay to cheat the
system a little.
3. Board members seek and accept responsibility.
Directors must make the connection between taking
actions and being able to safeguard assets, evaluate
management’s performance, and develop and guide a
strategy for the entrepreneurship.Thus, entrepreneur-
ial directors derive an obligation for setting up tasks,
guiding performance, and recognizing results.
Contentedness
Directors of entrepreneurships must search for a different
set of incentives, rewards, and satisfactions from their
counterpart directors of larger corporations. High retainer
fees, consulting fees, committee fees, status, and expensive
travel are not likely to be components of reward schemes
for entrepreneurial directors. Nor are entrepreneurial
directors likely to have consultants, corporate staff
experts, and other employee support. Part of their satisfac-
tion will emerge from being able to see that they utilize
their skills to improve the performance and effectiveness
of their entrepreneurs. Additional satisfactions will derive
from rewards that result from profitable performance of
the entrepreneurship. Good target behaviors for practicing
entrepreneurial director contentedness are the following:
1. Board members display a positive attitude. Carrying
any grudge and complaining will quickly transpire
into the perceptions of managers, shareholders, and
employees.
2. Board members savor the moments of satisfaction
resulting from the struggle. Entrepreneurial directors
must carefully set up strategic processes that contain
checkpoints for assessing the amount of accomplish-
ment achieved during carefully determined time
frames. They must learn to recognize and reward
themselves and others for small accomplishments
within the longer range process toward success.
3. Board members find happiness in utilizing and apply-
ing their skills. Entrepreneurial board members will
have to spend a considerable amount of time and pos-
sess a high degree of skill in managing detail, investi-
gating opportunities, collecting data, and utilizing
technology for developing pathways of opportunities
that their business can take advantage of.
Conclusions
The traditional definition of the board’s role is not a suffi-
cient condition for meeting the challenges that entrepre-
neurs encounter. The entrepreneurial board member will
evolve his or her role by achieving three important criteria
(Greenleaf 1977).
1.An awareness should exist that a critical watch is
being kept over the institution’s direction.
2.A healthy tension must always exist between belief in
the current status quo of the institution and the urge
to question, offer advice, and even criticize.
3.A feeling must be possessed by directors of an author-
ity role, which includes freedom to make expressions
and suggestions, to ask questions, and to require infor-
mation from employees and managers.
The entrepreneurial board must be capable of collecting
and filtering facts and data through their introspective and
vigilant instincts that will evolve cross-functional integrat-
ing insights. Further, they provide the skill, savvy, and ener-
gy that translate these insights into strategies. The execu-
tion of strategies calls for their careful monitoring, guid-
ance, and the addition of checkpoints for assessment of
these new windows of opportunity.
Entrepreneurial board members will gain an improved
understanding and insight into issues facing the entrepre-
neurship by engaging in discussions with employees and
in meeting with shareholders.The style of leadership prac-
ticed by management and its effectiveness will become evi-
dent to them.Through honest and frank discussions with-
out the CEO present, they will further understand the
strengths, limitations, opportunities, and threats of the
businesses they are guiding.
It would be helpful if board members would periodical-
ly evaluate each other. This expectation can provide an
incentive for each board member to be participative, con-
scientious, and diligent about improving the entrepreneur-
ship. In most instances, a three-year time span ought to be
long enough to allow each board member to make a posi-
tive contribution to the entrepreneurship.An honest evalu-
ation of the CEO of the entrepreneurship is also advisable.
To fulfill these expectations, five behavior constructs are
proposed to provide a model of the entrepreneurial direc-
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tor.Three key behavior patterns underlie each construct.The
entrepreneurial directorship entails the practice of charita-
bleness, patience, humility, adhering to a set of values and
contentedness in carrying out the board’s work routine.
By engaging in these behaviors, board members practice
servant directorship. They provide personal involvement in
engaging in entrepreneurial projects as well as providing
direction and guidance. If carried out properly, it will be the
entrepreneurial directors who will set a new standard for tra-
ditional boards to follow.
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Entrepreneurs starting new ventures will encounter ahost of legal issues requiring consultation with anattorney on an episodic or ongoing basis. It is criti-
cal that careful attention be given to the attorney selection
process to properly match the needs of the company with
the credentials of the attorney.Additionally, options should
be explored regarding the billing and payment methodolo-
gies the attorney is willing to entertain. The financial
resources and cash flow of young companies will likely
have a direct impact on the financial agreements entered
into with legal counsel. Further, companies desirous of
offering the attorney a stake in the company as full or par-
tial payment for legal services need to be mindful of ethi-
cal restrictions applicable to the lawyer, as well as excep-
tions to the lawyer’s malpractice coverage arising from his
or her role with the company.
Many start-up companies find themselves in need of period-
ic legal assistance but unable to bear the financial burden of
employing an attorney full time. Often their investment or
venture capital is dedicated to, and consumed by,other press-
ing needs of the company. When such an entity decides to
locate counsel with whom they can consult on an ongoing
basis, several pivotal elements are worthy of examination.The
expertise and demeanor of the attorney, his or her rate of
compensation, the relevant code of ethics governing the
attorney, and limitations of the policy language in the
lawyer’s malpractice policy can all have a profound effect on
the lawyer–client relationship. Such factors can restrict the
compensation methodology negotiated between the parties
and, in some cases, pose a hindrance to permitting legal
counsel to acquire an equity position with the venture.
The Initial Inquiry
During the initial stages of company formation, consultation
with qualified legal counsel is essential. Options relative to
company structure (i.e., partnership, corporation, limited lia-
bility company, etc.), financing, human resources, intellectual
property, governance, risk management, and insurance are
but a few of the areas in which an experienced counsel can
offer valuable advice. Once the time has arrived to consult
with an attorney for one or more of the mentioned areas,due
diligence should be exercised to ascertain whether the can-
didate attorney possesses the requisite background, educa-
tion, and expertise.Though at first blush it might be easy to
designate a specific area of the law as “critical” to your busi-
ness mission,a thoughtful review of the full continuum of the
company’s needs is warranted.
For instance, a start-up venture focused on the develop-
ment of a new software program may indicate a superficial
need for an attorney well versed in the various aspects of
intellectual property. This may prove to be short-sighted,
however, in the event the chosen attorney, while experi-
enced in intellectual property, is not conversant with many of
the other concerns the company will undoubtedly have,such
as organizational structure, site of incorporation (if any),
employment, tax,contractual, financing, and governance mat-
ters. While no single attorney is an expert in every field,
young companies can frequently link with an attorney com-
petent in several areas of law likely to be encountered and be
referred to other counsel in specialized areas on an “as-need-
ed” basis.
Even a straight forward decision such as whether to incor-
porate carries significant ramifications for a business.
Decisions pertaining to stock offerings, classes of stock, com-
position of the board of directors, duties and authorities of
officers,and selection of the jurisdiction in which to incorpo-
rate are but some of the choices competent counsel can
assist with.The optimum time to consider these options is in
the initial start-up phase rather than amending documents
after initial decisions have been implemented.
By way of example, there can be dozens of preliminary
matters or issues in the formative stage of a new venture
which would be valuable, if not essential, for legal counsel to
be consulted.These may include:
1. Does the venture have any intellectual property and, if
so, is it adequately protected? Patents, trademarks, and
copyrights fall into this category.
2. Is the company currently working on ideas that are pro-
prietary in nature but that have not yet been formally
protected? Trade secrets and other confidential informa-
tion fall into this realm. Are there sufficient safeguards
applicable to such confidential information, such as
password, biometric, or other security measures? If it is
necessary to consult with outside third parties, are care-
fully worded nondisclosure agreements used?
3.When deciding how to organize and structure a new
company, tax issues, liability concerns, financing
options, the use of employees versus subcontractors,
governance options, board of directors structure, voting
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rights, and contract matters can all present thorny ques-
tions in the early stage of a company’s existence which
would benefit from legal consultation.
4.When contemplating what financing options may be
available, careful evaluation of relevant state and federal
security laws is a necessity. Legal counsel can assist in
explaining what methods may be used, the requisite
forms that must be executed, and the myriad rules with
which the company will need to comply.
5.The sovereignty under which the organization is to be
created can often involve a discussion and review of var-
ious state laws.Certainly the locale of the primary enter-
prise and its ancillary activities will be a factor but, addi-
tionally,pondering the benefits and drawbacks of corpo-
rations, limited liability companies and partnerships, the
differences in some state laws may be determinative of
where to create your business legally.
6. Governance issues are almost universally a key consid-
eration with new ventures. Questions involving what
individuals will have day-to-day operating authority,who
can sign checks and contracts, what rights investors
have, how large a governing board is appropriate, how
the board is selected/elected, whether officers and
directors can be removed and, if so, for what reason—
are all decisions that can best be made with legal coun-
sel after a thorough review of the relevant facts at hand.
There is no “one-size-fits-all” template that can guide
ventures.
Though the factors mentioned above frequently arise in
the formative stages of a venture, each can also become crit-
ical later in the entity’s life span as conditions change.
Perhaps there is a challenge to the company’s intellectual
property or it appears someone is infringing on the venture’s
intellectual property, a new round of financing may be
desired which involves the creation of another class of stock
with differing rights, the issuance of stock options may be
contemplated, or carefully drafted employment contracts are
needed.Each event may trigger a beneficial consultation with
an attorney.
One benefit of using a law firm instead of an individual
practitioner is the breadth and scope of expertise available
within the firm. While this can be a significant asset, the
client company should clearly investigate during its initial
discussions the billing rates for other attorneys it may need
to consult.Young and start-up ventures often find budgetary
surprises that can drain cash flow and impact its economic
stability, so exploring all potential legal costs for using coun-
sel can result in a more accurate financial projection.
In similar fashion, interviews with various attorneys
should be conducted to reveal not only their areas of knowl-
edge, but also their personalities and offer some insight as to
whether their demeanors would integrate sufficiently with
those of the company principals with whom they would be
working. Clear, concise, and effective communication
between legal counsel and company representatives is indis-
pensable to getting the most out of the attorney–client rela-
tionship. Personalities and perspectives that seem to clash at
the outset are unlikely to improve with time or get better
under pressure situations.
A practical aspect of selecting legal counsel is to research
which attorneys or firms in the geographical area are accus-
tomed to representing start-ups and presumably are knowl-
edgeable about the uncertainties and timing of venture capi-
tal and resultant cash flow.Word of mouth, recommendations
from other companies, scanning profiles in legal databases,
and advertisements in phone directories are but a few of the
ways to search out such firms.Attorneys who have dealt with
several new ventures are likely to be more familiar with
billing options that are more favorable to the client. Reduced
hourly or project rates, delayed billing,“blended rate billing,”
“value billing,”or modified retainer arrangements might offer
an emerging business a greater degree of financial latitude to
enhance its chances for success.
Once firms with this experience are identified, reference
checks and informal inquiries can be conducted to ascertain
the strengths and weaknesses others may have experienced
with the lawyers.This information can better assist the com-
pany in selecting counsel most suitable to their enterprise.
Costs
Once an attorney or law firm appears to have the necessary
skills and credentials, young companies are prudent to
explore the compensation rate the attorney charges thor-
oughly.This can vary widely depending on geographic loca-
tion (i.e., urban v. rural), size (solo practitioner v. law firm),
type of unit billing (per hour, per diem, daily, retainer, etc.),
and terms of the retention agreement (client billed monthly,
quarterly, etc.). All options have the potential to affect the
company, its operations, and cash flow.
Recently, some law firms have recognized the unique
needs of entrepreneur driven start-ups and have begun offer-
ing a fixed annual fee in exchange for a mutually agreed upon
range of legal services,much like an “outsourcing”of the legal
counsel role (Edelstein 2006). In this way, some firms facili-
tate access to any of their member attorneys, as needed, so
long as the utilization does not exceed the parameters estab-
lished in the contract with the start-up company. One poten-
tial drawback is that either party may not want to renew the
contract upon its expiration, and this would require a new
search for legal counsel.
Other creative billing arrangements include “blended
billing”and “value billing.”Most law firms that have more than
one attorney performing services for a client have partners,
associates, and legal assistants working on a client file with
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each charging a separate rate. When taking on a new emerg-
ing client, the firm might be persuaded to undertake a blend-
ed rate in which the estimated hours necessitating a partner
and the hours expected of an associate(s) or legal assistant
have their respective rates “blended”to arrive at a more mod-
erate per hour charge to the client. Law firms agreeing to this
format undertake a certain degree of risk if they seriously
miscalculate (and hence underestimate) the number of hours
or tasks that can be satisfactorily performed by an associate
at a rate lower than the partner.This arrangement, however,
can soften the financial burden on the new company by
moderating what would otherwise likely be a much higher
legal bill.
In “value billing,” the company client and law firm thor-
oughly review the client’s legal needs, the tasks needed to be
performed, the results the parties expect to receive, and the
timeframe within which the services and results should
occur.By mutual agreement, the parties reach a consensus on
what the value of the legal services will be if the desired
benchmarks are met. If performance falls below expecta-
tions, the client and law firm can consider a discount or
reduction in fees to reflect the difference. (McMenamin
2007).
While start-ups can be lawyer-intensive in the formative
stages, requiring advice in many organizational areas and in
policy development, successful growth and expansion is also
likely to increase demands for counsel as licensing,contracts,
intellectual property, human resource, and other dimensions
expand. Adequate flexibility should be built into budgets in
hopes of remaining capable of securing services in a timely
matter as needs arise.
Offering Equity in Exchange for Fees
In some situations, young start-ups find the idea of offering
an equity position in the company as “compensation” for a
predetermined amount of legal services attractive. While at
first this can appear viable, it is not without significant reper-
cussions worthy of extended analysis.
An attorney wishing to accept a company’s offer of equi-
ty for legal services rendered must ensure he or she does so
in compliance with the code of ethics applicable in that
state. Every jurisdiction has a code of ethics governing attor-
ney conduct and most have provisions that apply when a
lawyer obtains an interest in the client. Specific language
from state to state differs, but the common theme is that a
lawyer must advise the client (i.e., company) of a potential
conflict of interest, obtain the client’s consent, and secure
written documentation of such consent. Depending on the
circumstances, a conflict of interest could arise in a number
of ways.An entrepreneur launching a new company may be
in immediate need of legal services and offer a sought-after
attorney shares in the company as a way of reducing compa-
ny expenditures.This can usually be done, albeit with certain
safeguards in place.
The Canons of Ethics applicable in various forms in most
states prohibit a conflict of interest between lawyer and
client. Consider, as an example, a relevant provision of the
North Carolina State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct
(North Carolina State Bar 2006):
Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction
with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest
directly adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing in a manner that can be reasonably under-
stood by the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability
of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity
to seek the advice of independent legal counsel
on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the
transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transac-
tion, including whether the lawyer is representing
the client in the transaction.
In many instances the position of the lawyer holding an
equity interest will be identical to the interest of the compa-
ny as a whole.The possibility exists, however, for their two
interests to conflict. Suppose the attorney holds voting
shares of stock as his equitable “payment” and management
proposes one course of action for shareholder approval and
the lawyer disagrees and votes contrary to the company’s
proposal. In such a scenario the interest of the two parties
would not be consistent. Complicating this alternative even
more is the nearly impossible task of predicting future events
the company may encounter that could generate a conflict of
interest.Though its language is not identical, the State Bar of
Michigan has similar rules governing its licensees (State Bar
of Michigan 2006).
California, in its Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically
targets a lawyer’s financial interest with clients for cautionary
review. In relevant part, its rules (California State Bar, Rules of
Professional Conduct 2007) state:
(B) A member shall not accept or continue representa-
tion of a client without providing written disclosure
to the client where:
(1) The member has a legal,business, financial,profes-
sional, or personal relationship with a party or
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witness in the same matter; or
(2) The member knows or reasonably should know
that:
(a) the member previously had a legal, business,
financial,professional,or personal relationship
with a party or witness in the same matter;and
(b) the previous relationship would substantially
affect the member's representation; or
(3) The member has or had a legal,business, financial,
professional, or personal relationship with anoth-
er person or entity the member knows or reason-
ably should know would be affected substantially
by resolution of the matter; or
(4) The member has or had a legal,business, financial,
or professional interest in the subject matter of
the representation.
These factors strongly suggest that the more balanced and
“arms-length”approach would be to negotiate compensation
for attorney services on a per hour, per diem, per project, or
retainer contract basis.At a minimum, a start-up venture and
an attorney seeking to enter into an equity relationship need
to give serious evaluation to the applicable ethical rules gov-
erning the attorney’s participation.While sanctions for viola-
tions might be imposed on the attorney and not the client
company, it is important the lawyer–client relationship be
formed in a legitimate fashion serving the best interests of
both parties.
The Insurance Dilemma
Even if the company successfully negotiates with an attorney
for an equitable stake in their company and satisfies the eth-
ical mandates required, the attorney may still be confronted
with another risk deserving careful analysis.
The majority of practicing attorneys carry legal malprac-
tice insurance to cover errors or omissions they might make
in the rendition of professional services, much as a physician
carries medical malpractice insurance.As with every contract
of insurance, the actual terms, conditions, and limitations of
the specific policy govern what is insured. Sometimes the
policy language can exclude coverage for lawyers acting on
behalf of a company in an official capacity, such as an officer,
director, etc. Consider the following coverage exclusion in a
North Carolina liability carrier’s policy (Lawyers Mutual
2006):
EXCLUSIONS
(g) any claim, or any theory of liability asserted in a suit,
based in whole or in any part upon any insured’s
act(s) or omission(s) occurring in whole or in part,
while such Insured is,in any way,or to any extent,act-
ing in his or her capacity as an owner,officer,manag-
er, director, shareholder, member, partner, trustee,
employee, or fiduciary (other than as covered by the
provisions of II. Coverage– Fiduciary) of a business
enterprise, regardless of whether for profit, or of a
not-for-profit or charitable organization, or of a pen-
sion, welfare, profit-sharing, mutual or investment
fund or trust;
…
(i) any claim or any theory of liability asserted in a suit,
based in whole or in any part upon the liability of any
Insured to a member of the family of such Insured,or
to any other Insured, or to the testamentary or trust
estate of any such person, or any liability of the
Insured to any business enterprise (regardless of
whether for-profit or a not-for-profit or charitable
organization), or the owners thereof, not designated
in this Declarations of this policy,which at the time of
the act(s) or omission(s) of any Insured upon which
liability is based, in whole or in any part, was a busi-
ness enterprise in which any Insured,or a member of
the family of any Insured, or of different Insureds, or
the testamentary or trust estates of any such person
or persons,together or individually,owned as much as
a 15 percent interest (whether legal, equitable or in
combination),and which liability is based in whole or
in any part,or to the extent,upon the conduct of such
business (including, but not limited to, the owner-
ship, maintenance, use or care of any personal or real
property);
Depending upon the specifics of the contractual arrange-
ment,a lawyer holding an equitable interest in a start-up com-
pany, either while serving as its lawyer on a fee-for-service
basis or receiving an interest in the company as payment for
his or her services,may find that his professional liability cov-
erage would not extend to acts or omissions involving that
particular client (Graebe 2003). Though certainly posing a
risk to the individual lawyer or lawyers involved, this could
also present a peril to the company in the event the attorney
made a serious mistake causing damage to the company and
insurance coverage was not applicable.
A more perplexing and ambiguous dilemma may arise in
situations offering the attorney stock options at a strike price
in the future. By its nature, an option could be exercised at a
future date or be allowed to lapse without execution. In the
former, the analysis would likely focus on the time at which
legal advice was rendered and whether, at that time, the
options had been exercised. In the latter, the insured attorney
would have a strong argument that he or she at no time had
an equitable interest in the company inasmuch as the option
represented only a future possibility that never materialized.
For insurance purposes, the argument would continue that
62 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
62
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 10 [2007], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol10/iss2/1
the attorney was not in a conflict of interest that triggered
the exclusion of malpractice coverage. Additionally, such an
ambiguity could place the burden of legal construction on
the insurer that presumptively was the drafter of the con-
tract.The long established doctrine of “contra proferentem”
calls for such language to be construed against the party that
drafted it (Black’s Law Dictionary 1968).
Though the use of options may offer some value in navi-
gating around particular malpractice insurance coverage
exclusions, it must simultaneously be viewed from a potential
investor’s vantage point.Those seeking to invest are likely to
be swayed one way or another by the company’s balance
sheet and financial statements. An attorney vested with
shares of a company in exchange for services may be viewed
less favorably than one holding options exercisable in the
future. As with most components of new ventures, such deci-
sions should not be considered in a vacuum, but rather
viewed from the perspective of all stakeholders.
Another concern arises when the company would like the
attorney to serve as an officer or director of the venture
itself. While the traditional malpractice policy typically cov-
ers acts arising from legal representation, many exclude cov-
erage for acts performed as an officer or director of a compa-
ny as these are seen as different and distinct from acts while
acting solely as an attorney.Many companies obtain directors
and officers liability coverage,often termed “D&O insurance,”
to insure against errors and omissions made by company offi-
cials. Should the company have such a policy, the company’s
attorney would likely be included among its insureds for acts
arising in his or her capacity as an officer, while the lawyer’s
malpractice policy would respond for acts of negligence in
legal representation.An attorney serving both as legal coun-
sel and an office or director should have both types of cover-
ages.
Summary
In the process of determining the type of compensation
arrangement the company wants to have with its legal coun-
sel, a multitude of factors should be weighed. Financial
resources, cash flow projections, attorney billing rates, fre-
quency of billing, lawyer education and expertise, the desig-
nation of the attorney as legal counsel or officer, director or
other capacity, and the best interest of the company as a enti-
ty should be carefully evaluated. In terms of the potential for
conflicts of interest, both the company and the lawyer need
to individually scrutinize their positions for incursions of rel-
evant rules of ethical conduct, insurance gaps, and compet-
ing interest.A “problem” for the lawyer is also tantamount to
a“problem”for the company and vice versa.The optimal rela-
tionship should form a solid, firm foundation for both parties.
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